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Since the 2007/8 global financial crisis, common factors such as low and protracted global 
interest rates may have sustained rising debt levels in emerging market and developing 
economies (EMDEs) like South Africa. This mini-dissertation attempts to characterise the 
South African financial cycle so as to determine the role of common global factors that 
potentially drive South African debt levels. First, the South African credit-to-GDP gap is 
constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to determine the role of private sector credit 
frictions in generating domestic credit procyclicality. Next, a dynamic factor model is used to 
characterise the South African financial cycle with 13 macro-financial variables from 1980 to 
2016. The South African financial cycle is then decomposed to determine the driving forces, 
and then compared to the Miranda-Aggripino and Rey (2018) global financial cycle and the 
VIX, to disentangle the effects of common global from idiosyncratic factors. The results reveal 
that the South African credit cycle is weakly countercyclical, suggesting the domestic business 
cycle may lead credit growth. Additionally, the South African financial cycle is driven mainly 
by common movements in the funding, credit, equity and global markets. Moreover, moderate 
positive co-movement with the global financial cycle, and stronger negative co-movement with 
the VIX, suggests the South African financial cycle is not isolated from common global factors. 
Therefore, we can infer that South African post-crisis debt growth may be a symptom of low 
and protracted global interest rates over the period. Based on these results, policymakers are 
advised to consider targeted macroprudential measures, such as balance sheet stress testing 
and macroprudential levies, to manage specific vulnerabilities. 
Keywords: Emerging Market Debt, HP Filter, Global Financial Cycle, Factor Analysis, Macro-
Financial Linkages 
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While advanced economies (AEs) have experienced substantial deleveraging since 
the 2007/8 global financial crisis, debt levels in emerging market and developing 
economies (EMDEs) have been increasing steadily (Bank for International 
Settlements [BIS], 2015; World Bank, 2018). This phenomenon has occurred most 
prominently in the South African public sector, with government debt increasing from 
40% of GDP in 2008 to approximately 50% of GDP in 2017 (South African Reserve 
Bank [SARB], 2018a). With the rise in financial globalisation, the composition of 
external debt has evolved. Specifically, the majority of South African external debt has 
shifted from foreign currency to rand-denominated government debt held by non-
residents. This could merely reflect improved global investor diversification and capital 
market deepening in South Africa. However, it also raises the potential for systemic 
default risk through currency mismatches and public finance fragility.  
Despite external debt growth becoming associated more with banking sector fragility 
through foreign currency mismatches, empirical evidence finds a limited role for 
nominal exchange rate movements in explaining this relationship for EMDEs (World 
Bank, 2018). This then raises questions about the relationship between domestic 
credit procyclicality and cross-border capital flows. From a broad macro-financial 
perspective, it requires an inquiry into the relationships that govern both domestic and 
global financial frictions that may be characterised by the financial cycle. It is against 
this backdrop that this mini-dissertation questions the common movements that drive 
the systematic build-up of credit default risk in the South African financial system. 
Specifically, the study questions what determines the South African financial cycle? 
And, is it isolated from common global financial movements? If the South African 
financial cycle is not found to be isolated, then we may infer that current levels of 
government debt growth may be a symptom of depressed global interest rates over 
the post-crisis period.  
Despite a strong theoretical basis through financial accelerator (FA) models, there is 
no consensual definition of the financial cycle. Generally, it refers to the tendency of 
financial frictions to amplify business cycle fluctuations through changes in the 
perception of value, risk and financing constraints. Therefore, various approaches 
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exist to characterise the financial cycle. As a strong indicator of financial system stress, 
the credit cycle may be used to capture rising default risk. However, it only provides 
an indirect measure of systemic risk that arises from private sector frictions. Moreover, 
studies find that credit frictions tend to affect systemic risk more significantly when 
combined with asset prices. This leads some authors to characterise the financial 
cycle using a combination of credit aggregates and asset prices.  
Given the relationship between credit and collateral, Borio (2012), Drehmann, Borio & 
Tsatsaronis (2012) and the SARB (2015) find credit, property prices and equity prices 
to provide the most parsimonious description of the financial cycle. However, while 
credit and equity prices appear to be more correlated for AEs, Terrones, Kose and 
Claessens (2011) find credit and exchange rates to be more correlated for EMDEs. 
While this is consistent with the latter countries’ susceptibility to currency risk, it also 
implies that a more comprehensive characterisation of the financial cycle is warranted. 
This can be addressed by including variables that represent various sectors of the 
macro-financial system. One approach is to characterise the financial cycle based on 
the idea of a financial conditions index (FCI).  
FCIs attempt to provide a summary measure of domestic macro-financial conditions 
by capturing the common movements among a broad set of variables that influence 
economic behaviour (Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholtz & Watson, 2010; 
Kabundi & Mbelu, 2017). In addition to credit and asset prices, variables that are 
included generally range from banking sector leverage and liquidity indicators to credit 
spreads, exchange rates and commodity prices. Therefore, by including variables that 
capture terms of access to financing and risk attitudes, FCIs can be used to provide a 
close approximation of the general definition of the financial cycle. Moreover, by 
including currency fluctuations and global commodity prices, FCIs make an explicit 
attempt to capture global changes that may influence the domestic macro-financial 
landscape. 
From a global perspective, evidence seems to point to significant co-movement among 
variables such as risky asset prices, financial aggregates and cross-border leverage 
and credit growth (Bruno & Shin, 2015a, 2015b; Cerutti, Claessens & Ratnovski, 2017; 
Forbes & Warnock, 2012; Fratzscher, 2012; Nier, Saadi & Mondino, 2014). Miranda-
Agrippino and Rey (2018), Passari and Rey (2015) and Rey (2013) define this 
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phenomenon as the global financial cycle. The global financial cycle may be 
interpreted as a reflection of aggregate global risk aversion based on its relationship 
with the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Market Volatility Index (VIX). The 
CBOE VIX is measured by the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options and is 
frequently used as a proxy for aggregate economic uncertainty and investor risk 
aversion. Since the global financial cycle is shown to exhibit a negative relationship 
with the VIX, it may then be characterised as a measure of global financial market 
strain and risk perception. 
Using the structural negative relationship with the VIX in a model with heterogeneous 
investors, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2018) represent the global financial cycle as a 
reflection of the combined preferences and constraints of global banks and asset 
managers. When risk-neutral global banks and mean-variance global asset managers 
become the main investors, the combined interaction between their preferences and 
constraints can be identified by fluctuations in the global financial cycle. Specifically, 
the combination of risk-taking global banks and risk-averse asset managers tends to 
reduce global risk aversion and premiums1 over time. This translates into an upswing 
in the global financial cycle, where rising global asset demand and narrowing lending 
spreads can transmit a self-propagating mechanism of excessive leverage and risk-
taking behaviour to domestic financial systems. 
The potential of procyclical transmission through the global financial cycle is 
complicated further by the dominance of US currency in global banking. Specifically, 
it raises questions about the relationship between US monetary policy, the cost of 
global funding and the value of dollar-denominated assets and liabilities. Miranda-
Agrippino and Rey (2018) find a strong link between monetary policy in the US and 
fluctuations in the global financial cycle. Consequently, changes in US policy rates 
may present a significant driving force behind the global financial cycle and its 
transmission to domestic economies. This implies significant monetary policy spill-
overs, which in turn challenge the prevailing Mundellian trilemma theory.  
                                                          
1 The risk premium is assumed to be dependent on the wealth distribution between leveraged global 
banks and asset managers, such as insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds or pension funds 
(Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2018). 
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The trilemma theory expresses the limitations that policymakers face in the 
management of stable exchange rates, free capital mobility and independent monetary 
policy. Specifically, despite joint desirability, monetary autonomy only becomes 
possible under floating exchange rates regimes with free capital mobility. This 
suggests that US monetary policy spill-overs should only occur in situations where 
currencies are not free to respond to changing levels of capital flows. Therefore, 
without controls on capital movements under a fixed exchange rate regime, national 
monetary policy becomes constrained by changes in US monetary policy. However, 
the presence of a global financial cycle in an environment with external balance sheet 
debt changes this relationship.  
If US monetary policy is a potential determinant of domestic financial cycles through 
the global financial cycle, the trilemma morphs into a ‘Dilemma’ with the interest rate 
becoming ineffective (Rey, 2013; Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2018). Despite a floating 
currency with free capital mobility, national monetary policy might become constrained 
by responses in external balance sheet debt. This would create a national policy 
dilemma between output and balance sheet stability. Protracted US monetary easing 
would simultaneously raise the value of domestic currency (by stimulating capital 
inflows), while reducing the value of external balance sheet debt (through dollar 
depreciation). On the one hand, an easing in domestic monetary policy would reduce 
capital inflows and depreciate the currency. However, it would simultaneously raise 
the value of external debt while stimulating domestic borrowing. Therefore, post-crisis 
growth in EMDE debt levels may be explained by low and protracted global interest 
rates over the past ten years since the global financial crisis.  
With that in mind, this study conducts a two-stage analysis of the determinants of 
South Africa’s financial cycle to establish whether it is isolated from the global financial 
cycle or not. First, the analysis begins by constructing the South African credit-to-GDP 
gap to determine whether it is fully aligned with and procyclical to the business cycle. 
To that end, systemic risk is empirically defined as source-independent credit default 
risk that is faced by the entire domestic macro-financial system (De Bandt & Hartmann, 
2000; Borio, Furfine  & Lowe, 2001). This definition is based on the assumption that 
financial frictions are partly driven by changes in bank capital that influence financing 
constraints, which may result in system-wide build-ups of default risk. Following the 
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Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [BCBS], 2010) a one-sided Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing parameter of 400 0002 is used to extract the South 
African credit cycle, which is then compared to the business cycle to determine 
procyclicality.  
If the South African credit cycle is found to be countercyclical, it would provide strong 
evidence that systemic risk may be driven by factors more common to the entire 
financial system. Therefore, the second stage involves constructing a more 
comprehensive measure of the South African financial cycle to determine the main 
driving forces behind common systematic risk build-up. To construct the financial 
cycle, the analysis uses 13 variables that capture economic behaviour and risk 
sentiment, and that fall within seven main sectors of the macro-financial system. 
Following Kabundi and Mbelu (2017) and Oet, Bianco, Gramlich and Ong (2012), the 
financial market is characterised by six main sectors: the credit, equity, real estate, 
foreign exchange, funding and global markets. Additionally, real GDP is included as a 
macroeconomic variable that responds to and affects changes in the financial sector. 
Moreover, the systemic risk is used to determine the role of common driving forces. 
Therefore, it is re-defined as source-dependent risk, driven primarily by cyclical forces 
that are common to the entire macro-financial system (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Borio 
et al., 2001). 
Due to empirical difficulties in defining cyclical movements, there is no consensus on 
how these forces are assumed to drive the systematic build-up of credit default risk 
over the business cycle (Aikman, Haldane & Nelson, 2015; Drehmann et al., 2012; 
Terrones et al., 2011). Cyclical risk refers to the time dimension of systematic risk,3 
which is meant to capture non-transitory current and expected systemic vulnerabilities. 
While the HP filter may be used for testing systemic procyclicality, it may not be 
appropriate for charactering cyclical risk.4 Therefore, this study uses a dynamic factor 
model (DFM) framework to extract and decompose the common movements in South 
Africa’s financial cycle. DFMs assume that systemic risk comprises a systematic 
                                                          
2 Normally, the smoothing parameter is set to 1 600 for quarterly data for no methodological reason. 
3 Cyclical risk also includes a non-systematic (idiosyncratic) component that is specific to each variable 
or sector in the financial system; however, the focus of this study is on the common factors that 
propagate the correlation among variables. 
4 This is due to the statistical formalisation of the HP filter which characterises financial frictions as 
unpredictable temporary (transitory) systemic shocks. 
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component that is a function of several stochastic risk factors5 that are common to the 
system. Given an open economy framework, international diversification then reduces 
any remaining effects to idiosyncratic (non-systematic) factors, which may be specific 
to various sectors within the system. By characterising the data-generating process as 
being mean-reverting, the correlations between factors can be defined by factor 
loadings that capture the sensitivity of each variable to common systematic 
movements.  
This study concentrates on one specific factor, defined as credit (leverage) default risk, 
which is characterised by the relationship between asset prices and credit losses.6 
Therefore, factor loadings reflect the response of each sector-specific variable to 
changes in the perception of default risk. Specifically, financial cycle upswings are 
assumed to represent periods in which asset prices are relatively higher than debt 
levels. This raises the probability of expected and unexpected credit defaults as the 
upswing progresses to a boom. Consequently, as the boom turns to a bust and asset 
prices fall, relatively higher debt levels raise the occurrence of actual defaults, which 
may result in systemically relevant credit losses. Therefore, upswings are assumed to 
represent periods of low asset price volatility, with a lower response of the system to 
common factors. Conversely, downswings are assumed to represent periods of high 
asset price volatility, with higher sensitivity to common movements. 
The results reveal that the South African credit cycle is weakly countercyclical to the 
business cycle, suggesting a possible lead-lag relationship between credit and output. 
While financial accelerator theory assumes that credit leads output, countercyclicality 
may point to South African output leading credit growth. Additionally, asset price, 
commodity price, exchange rate, structural and regulatory changes all play a role in 
determining excessive private sector credit growth. This provides preliminary evidence 
that various factors influence the cyclical fluctuations that characterise the South 
African macro-financial system. Confirming this is that the South African financial cycle 
is driven by common movements within the funding, credit, equity and global markets. 
While banking-sector leverage contributes the highest share, it has the lowest 
                                                          
5 Stochastic properties describe a type of mathematical rule that governs the probability of movement 
of time-series variables. 
6 This arises from the conceptual definition of credit losses: the probability of default (credit risk) or loss 
given default (asset-to-debt risk). 
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response to changes in common systematic movements. Moreover, as leverage is 
found to rise during downswings, the countercyclicality of the South African credit 
market may be confirmed. 
Considering external effects, the global market contributes a significant share to 
common movements, with an equally high response to changes in the common factor. 
Moreover, the South African financial cycle shows moderately positive co-movement 
with the global financial cycle. This implies a moderately procyclical relationship, with 
evidence that global fluctuations may lead the South African financial cycle. 
Additionally, the South African financial cycle shows a moderately strong negative co-
movement with the VIX. This implies a stronger domestic response to changes in 
global risk aversion that may emanate from idiosyncratic EMDE risk perception. Taken 
together, this suggests that the South African financial cycle is not isolated from 
common global financial frictions. With a highly advanced and globally integrated 
financial market, we can infer that post-crisis debt growth in the South African public 
sector may partly be driven by monetary policy at the centre. 
With the consequences of increased financial globalisation remaining a contentious 
debate, evidence of global spill-overs as a potential determinant of the South African 
financial cycle implies significant challenges and opportunities for national 
policymaking (Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2018; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2009). This 
result becomes more significant as risks of faster paced US interest rates and dollar 
appreciation increase ten years after the crisis (Rey, 2016; World Bank, 2018). Given 
moderate exposure to the Global Financial Cycle, South African policymakers appear 
to face a ‘dilemma’ between the pursuit of output and balance sheet stabilisation. 
Specifically, without a move towards financial fragmentation or the use of additional 
policy measures, we can infer that South African monetary policy is partly dictated by 
monetary policy elsewhere. Therefore, this calls for the supplementary use of 
macroprudential measures to manage both domestic and global financial frictions 
during different phases of the business cycle.  
As a framework, macroprudential policy represents the incorporation of financial 
objectives into macroeconomic policy, with the goal of addressing macro-financial 
stability. Specifically, it involves the identification of systemic risks and the use of 
various instruments that improve the measurement and management of these risks. 
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Therefore, instrument design tends to be guided by the reduction in potentially 
systemic financial risk while strengthening the resilience of the financial system to 
unwanted shocks (Adrian, Covitz & Liang, 2015; BCBS, 2010; Borio, 2012; Caruana, 
2010; Karmakar, 2016; Liu & Molise, 2018; SARB, 2016). Prior to the global financial 
crisis, policymakers assumed that the optimal policy design involved ‘pricking the 
bubble before it burst’. This is based on the idea that financial vulnerabilities can easily 
be identified and muted before becoming systemic by using a single instrument: the 
nominal interest rate. However, with the role of procyclicality in masking financial 
vulnerabilities that led to the crisis, policymakers have turned to alternative design 
options.  
Since the 2007/2008 crisis, macroprudential policy has evolved with a strong focus on 
strengthening the system while simultaneously taking advantage of potentially 
destabilising imbalances. Therefore, instrument design is now guided by the building 
up of provisions during expansions that may be drawn down during contractionary 
periods. Such design philosophy, known as ‘leaning against the wind’, focuses on 
leaning against cyclical amplifications to build up provisions that can then be used to 
reinforce the macro-financial system against negative shocks. As such, successful 
post-crisis macroprudential policy involves the improved identification of systemic 
risks, combined with the use of instruments that are based on building up provisions 
during good times that can be drawn down during bad times. From a practical policy-
making perspective, this requires the strategic combination of flexible medium-term 
buffers that prepare and restore policy scope for more aggressive long-term 
macroeconomic policy. 
Specifically, this study suggests that monetary policy should focus on extending 
forecast horizons over the medium term and consider the use of temporary alternative 
capital controls in the case of severe currency depreciations. Given the changing 
composition of external debt, policymakers are advised to consider the use of a 
macroprudential stability levy on systemically relevant exposure to changes in 
externally denominated debt. Additionally, prudential policy should focus on using 
balance sheet stress‐testing and leverage limits to reduce the amplitude of externally 
exposed banking sector asset values. Specifically, there should be an increased 
frequency of targeted stress testing of banks and corporations with higher exposure 
 9 
 
to external assets, and tougher leverage limits for institutions and corporates with 
highly sensitive debt service costs.  
Finally, fiscal policy should consider targeted taxes on international credit flows 
directed towards funding other than public sector restructuring. Financing could then 
be directed to education, healthcare and public infrastructure upgrades through tax 
exemptions. Given the anticipated changes in global export demand, all policy 
measures should be guided by overarching macroeconomic objectives aimed at long-
term export-sector diversification. Specifically, targeted and well-managed strategic 
investment funds (SIFs) could be set up to build long-term fiscal capacity. Additionally, 
increased education and training support for absorbing new technologies would 
improve labour market efficiency, while fostering the entrepreneurship and innovation 
that are necessary for sustainable long-term growth and development (Callen, Cherif, 
Hasanov, Hegazy & Khandelwal, 2014; World Bank, 2018). 
This mini-dissertation makes two main contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it 
documents the theoretical and empirical challenges to monitoring and analysing the 
macro-financial system of South Africa. This is motivated by substantial gaps within 
the literature regarding the measurement, analysis and monitoring of systemic default 
risk following the crisis. While Akinboade and Makina (2009) and Fourie, Botha and 
Mears (2011) find South African credit extension to be procyclical, this study, like 
Bernstein, Raputsoane and Schaling (2016), finds evidence of credit 
countercyclicality. Therefore, this study aims to fill the gap by analysing the nature and 
behaviour of credit extension as a source of systemic risk in South Africa. 
Secondly, this study considers the changing nature of the post-crisis global and 
domestic transmission mechanisms, with a focus on the implications of global spill-
overs for South Africa. This is motivated by the growing literature on the implications 
of co-moving cross-border capital flows for national financial systems. With the 
combined evidence of a global financial cycle and growing post-crisis EMDE debt 
levels, the analysis in this study provides important insights into the mechanisms and 
magnitudes that underlie post-crisis international monetary policy spill-overs to South 
Africa. Additionally, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to 
explicitly compare the co-movement between the global financial cycle and a 
comprehensive measure of the South African financial cycle using a DFM framework. 
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Therefore, the results of this study help to inform policymaking regarding improved 
measurement of the systematic component of domestic default risk and its exposure 
to international financial frictions. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, the literature review is presented 
to contextualise the problem by discussing the relationships between external debt, 
domestic and global financial frictions and national policy implications. Next, the 
methodology is presented as a roadmap for empirical analysis to determine the driving 
forces behind the South African financial cycle. Following this, the empirical results 
are presented and discussed. Specifically, the co-movement between the South 
African credit and business cycle is analysed. Next, the South African financial cycle 
is presented and decomposed to determine the contribution of each financial sector in 
driving common movements. Then, to disentangle common global from idiosyncratic 
effects, the co-movement between the South African financial cycle, the global 
financial cycle and VIX is analysed. Finally, policy recommendations are presented, 
and conclusions are made. 
Literature Review 
EMDE Debt and External Factors 
The role of international factors in domestic debt accumulation 
Since the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, low global interest rates and risk premiums 
have managed to sustain relatively low debt service costs for the rapid pace of debt 
accumulation in EMDEs (Didier & Schmukler, 2014; Didier, Llovet Montanes & 
Schmukler, 2016; Love, Martinez Pería & Singh, 2016; Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 
2018; World Bank, 2018). While rising debt levels may be reflective of improved capital 
market deepening, the role of external forces in determining the nature and 
composition of domestic EMDE debt has also increased over the period. Specifically, 
excessive external debt exposure may affect banks’ balance sheets and willingness 
to supply credit.  
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As an asset, debt tends to strengthen banking solvency, which allows increased credit 
extension at a relatively higher average cost. As corporate7 and public sector liabilities, 
however, debt tends to reduce the value of collateral and weaken balance sheet 
fundamentals. Moreover, rising corporate debt may influence public finances through 
larger off-balance sheet liabilities.8 Weaker public sector balance sheets then add 
pressure to national budgets and borrowing requirements, which may result in 
sovereign downgrades. The potential long-run impact is lower aggregate real 
investment and higher aggregate financing costs. 
At this point, one may argue that the lower risk premium of bond financing has 
supported the rapid increase in debt issuances since the crisis. While longer average 
maturity does reduce premiums, vulnerability to negative shocks depends on the 
nature of balance sheet fundamentals and bond investors. Since 2009, increased 
dispersion of bond investors has appeared to raise the proportion of risky corporate 
debt issues, despite distress indicators such as falling interest coverage ratios (Feyen, 
Fiess, Zuccardi Huertas & Lambert, 2017; World Bank, 2018). Moreover, EMDEs’ 
corporate sector leverage has become increasingly concentrated among large 
domestic industrial firms, which may cause distortions and amplify systemic risks that 
only become noticed during subsequent contractions (Desai, Foley & Forbes, 2008).   
Additionally, large industrial firms tend to exhibit procyclical behaviour, which may 
negatively affect bank losses and weaken fiscal revenues. During contractions, rising 
industrial sector unemployment tends to decrease credit demand while raising default 
risks. Rising unemployment and declining fiscal revenues then place additional 
pressure on social spending and the borrowing requirement. This can lead to longer, 
more protracted downswings, which may become more complicated once external 
dimensions are considered.  
Recent literature reveals the growing role of external factors in driving the procyclicality 
of domestic banking sector leverage (Ayala, Nedeljkovic & Saborowski, 2017; Beltran, 
                                                          
7 While the discussion focuses on corporate private sector credit due to the rapid increase in EMDEs 
over the post-crisis period, the transmission mechanisms are assumed to work in a similar manner for 
households as part of the private sector (SARB, 2018; World Bank, 2018). 
8 Studies on EMDE debt dynamics have found a strong positive relationship between implicit liabilities 
and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which has resulted in sharp increases for both debt classes 
(World Bank, 2018). 
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Garud & Rosenblum, 2017; Byrne & Fiess, 2016; Chow, 2015; Feyen, Ghosh, Kibuuka 
& Farazi, 2015). Specifically, stress tests on EMDE corporates show the importance 
of external debt through the negative effect of exchange rate shocks on interest 
coverage ratios. Moreover, large firms with high proportions of external debt are found 
to be more sensitive to changes in debt service costs. All else being equal, domestic 
currency depreciations tend to increase the value of unhedged foreign currency 
liabilities, which then raises balance sheet fragility. 
Therefore, external debt has become associated more with balance sheet fragilities 
through mismatches in foreign currency liabilities and assets. Despite such findings, 
empirical evidence reveals that increases in post-crisis EMDE foreign currency debt 
have not been driven by nominal currency valuations (World Bank, 2018). This then 
raises questions about the driving forces behind external debt accumulation. 
Specifically, what drives domestic credit procyclicality and to what degree is it 
influenced by external factors?  
The Financial Cycle: A Domestic Perspective 
Characterising domestic macro-financial procyclicality 
The degree of domestic credit procyclicality has been studied extensively over time 
within the context of boom and bust cycles (Adrian & Shin, 2010a; Bernanke, Gertler 
& Gilchrist, 1999; Besomi, 2006; Borio, 2012; Borio et al., 2001; Brunnermeier & 
Sannikov, 2014; Daníelsson, Shin & Zigrand, 2004; Gertler & Bernanke, 1995; 
Kashyap & Stein, 2004; Kindleberger, 2009; Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997; Minsky, 1982). 
While post-war studies initiated the approach of directly relating financial movements 
to business cycle fluctuations, it was Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. 
(1999) who formalised the financial accelerator framework, which focuses on the 
presence of endogenous financial frictions.  
Specifically, the model explains how balance sheet changes may directly affect 
economic fluctuations through the asymmetric information between borrowers and 
lenders. The concept of procyclicality is explained by characterising financial frictions 
as the cost of an endogenously determined finance premium. While there currently is 
no consensus definition of the financial cycle, it generally refers to the effect of this 
procyclicality on macro-financial fluctuations. It refers to the propensity of financial 
frictions to amplify business cycle fluctuations through changes in financing constraints 
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(proxied by credit), perceptions of value (proxied by asset prices), and risk assessment 
(Adrian & Shin, 2010b; Borio, 2012; Borio et al., 2001; Daníelsson et al., 2004; 
Drehman et al., 2012; Kashyap & Stein, 2004; Ng, 2011).  
As a result, there are several ways to characterise the financial cycle. Based on 
several studies, a close association exists between disproportionate growth in credit 
aggregates and systemic risk build-up (Aikman et al., 2015; BCBS, 2010; Dell’Ariccia, 
Igan, Laeven & Tong, 2016; Goodhart & Tsomocos, 2011; Jorda, Schularick & Taylor, 
2011, 2015; Schularick & Taylor, 2012). Therefore, the credit cycle can be used to 
characterise systemic stress arising from a specific sector of the financial system. This 
is due to credit performing best among other financial variables as an early warning 
indicator of financial system stress. The most prominently used single measure 
characterisation of the credit cycle is the BCBS (2010) private sector credit-to-GDP 
gap (gap). From the broad perspective of managing credit constraints, the gap reflects 
the inverse relationship between bank balance sheet risk and bank capital. However, 
this measure assumes that domestic private sector credit and business cycles are fully 
aligned and procyclical.  
Several empirical studies find financial cycles to be longer and more pronounced than 
business cycles, with higher amplitudes over medium- to long-term frequencies of 
eight to 30 years9 (Aikman et al., 2015; Borio, 2012; Drehmann et al., 2012; Koopman 
& Lucas, 2005; Mendoza & Terrones, 2012; Terrones et al., 2011). Moreover, the 
empirical literature concerning credit procyclicality appears to be mixed, with Angelini, 
Neri and Panetta (2014), Helbling, Kose, Otrok and Huidrom (2011), Jorda et al. 
(2011), Repullo and Saurina (2011) and Schularick and Taylor (2012) finding evidence 
of procyclicality for most AEs, while Bouvatier, López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2014) 
find procyclicality in Canada, the UK and the USA, but not in Australia, Belgium, 
France, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain.  
Likewise, while Xu (2012) finds evidence of procyclicality in a combination of 33 AEs 
and EMDEs, no evidence is found by Bebczuk, Burdisso, Carrera and Sangiacomo 
(2011) and Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014) for a combination of 144 and 53 EMDEs 
and AEs respectively. Similarly, while Akinboade and Makina (2009) and Fourie et al. 
                                                          
9 Business cycles tend to operate over shorter-term frequencies of one to eight years (Borio, 2012). 
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(2011) find evidence of procyclicality for South Africa, Bernstein et al. (2016) find 
evidence of countercyclicality, with the South African credit-to-GDP gap increasing 
during real economic contractions and decreasing during expansions. Therefore, while 
the credit cycle may be an important factor in identifying systemic risk, more factors 
may be required to explain the overall procyclicality of the domestic financial system. 
While the gap provides the best measure of excessive private sector credit build-ups, 
it only provides an indirect reflection of system risk. Specifically, the higher the risk to 
future domestic credit constraints, the lower a country’s loss-absorption capacity given 
current regulatory capital requirements. However, such frictions have tended to play a 
more significant role in systemic destabilisation when combine with the behaviour of 
asset prices. Studies have found credit aggregates, property prices and equity prices 
to provide the most parsimonious characterisation of the financial cycle (Drehmann, 
Borio & Tsatsaronis, 2011; SARB, 2015; Terrones et al., 2011). 
However, while credit and equity prices appear to perform best for AEs, credit and 
exchange rates perform better for EMDEs (Terrones et al., 2011). Equity prices tend 
to perform poorly over the medium term due to higher volatility caused by external or 
sectoral effects. While this is consistent with the greater susceptibility of EMDEs to 
currency risk, it implies low responses of equity to changes in the financial cycle. 
Moreover, such characterisations fail to explicitly capture the effects of changes in risk 
perception. Therefore, studies have begun including variables such as banking 
leverage and liquidity, bond prices, credit spreads, interest rates, volatilities and risk 
premiums (Adrian & Shin, 2010b; Curdia & Woodford, 2010; Domanski & Ng, 2011; 
Gilchrist & Zakrajsek, 2012; Lown & Morgan, 2002; Poledna, Thurner, Farmer & 
Geanakoplos, 2014; Terrones et al., 2011).  
By including changes in terms of access to financing and risk attitudes, this measure 
represents the closest approximation of the general definition of the financial cycle. 
However, it fails to explicitly capture exchange rate movements, which are potentially 
significant for EMDEs. Moreover, the domestic financial system is made up of an 
interconnected network of domestic and external sectors that evolve and respond to 
the current economic environment and policies within it (Borio, 2012; Kabundi & 
Mbelu, 2017; Oet et al., 2012). Therefore, a more comprehensive approach to 
characterising the financial cycle may include representations of the entire financial 
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system. One such approach is based on the idea of a financial conditions index (FCI) 
that includes credit, asset, funding, foreign exchange and global market variables.  
FCIs are designed to provide a summary measure of domestic macro-financial 
conditions. This is done by capturing the common movements among a broad set of 
variables that influence economic behaviour (Hatzius et al., 2010; Kabundi & Mbelu, 
2017). Therefore, Domanski and Ng (2011), Hatzius et al. (2010) and Kabundi and 
Mbelu (2017) use FCIs to characterise domestic macro-financial conditions by 
combining a variety of financial price and quantity variables into a single informative 
index. Apart from credit and asset prices, variables included in an FCI generally range 
from banking sector leverage and liquidity indicators to credit spreads, exchange rates 
and commodity prices. By including global commodity prices and currency 
fluctuations, FCIs explicitly attempt to capture global effects that may influence 
domestic macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, by including variables that capture 
terms of access to financing and risk attitudes, FCIs can be used as a close 
approximation of the general definition of the financial cycle. 
Together with Austrian theory dynamics, FCIs can be used to characterise the financial 
cycle by common systematic forces that reflect the interactions between capital 
accumulation and financial decisions (Borio et al., 2001; Schumpeter, 1939). While 
such forces are assumed to be inherent in economic processes, there is no consensus 
on how they drive systematic risk over the business cycle. From the perspective of a 
closed system with financial accelerator frictions, the systematic component may be 
assumed to be a function of several common and idiosyncratic factors within the 
system (Borio & Lowe, 2002; Farrell & Kemp, 2017; Kabundi & Mbelu, 2017; Miranda-
Agrippino & Rey, 2018; Rey, 2013). Specifically, variables can be assumed to respond 
to common changes that affect the entire system, and to idiosyncratic changes specific 
to each sector.  
Based on the literature, one significant common driving force may be the 
misrepresentation of credit default risk. Therefore, systematic risk can be 
characterised by fluctuations in credit default risk, which generally relates to negative 
states. The general assumption is that actual credit losses rise during downswings, 
while expected and unexpected losses rise as upswings progress. During 
downswings, asset prices are assumed to be relatively lower than debt, resulting in an 
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increased probability of actual defaults. Similarly, the probability of actual loss given 
default will increase during recessions, especially for debt backed by procyclical 
collateral. The opposite would be true during upswings, i.e. relatively high asset-to-
debt values will increase the probability of expected and unexpected defaults. This is 
assumed to build up systematically over time, creating significant systemic default risk.  
During financial expansions, high asset-to-debt values increase the willingness of 
banks to extend credit. As collateral values rise, risk tends to be underestimated, which 
sustains excessive credit growth and the systematic build-up of default risk. 
Simultaneously, relatively low levels of bank capital may sustain unobserved financial 
imbalances10 and real-sector distortions,11 which then sow the seeds for a subsequent 
contraction. The opposite would be true during financial contractions, with the 
realisation of actual defaults reducing assets to debt values. This decreases the 
willingness of banks to extend credit, as risk tends to be overestimated, potentially 
resulting in a longer, more protracted contraction. However, the role of cross-border 
capital flows and changes in global risk aversion may place additional pressure on 
these endogenous mechanisms. 
The Financial Cycle: A Global Perspective 
Understanding co-movements in global capital f lows 
The recent crisis has highlighted the importance of global capital movements in 
creating boom and bust cycles, especially in EMDEs. As mentioned previously, 
external factors have become more dominant, with empirical studies finding significant 
co-movements among cross-border credit growth, asset prices and leverage flows 
over time (Bekaert, Hoerova & Lo Duca, 2010; Bruno & Shin, 2015b; Byrne & Fiess, 
2016; Daníelsson et al., 2004; Ehrmann, Fratzscher & Rigobon, 2011; Fratzscher, 
2012; Igan, Kabundi, De Simone, Pinheiro & Tamirisa, 2011; Miranda-Agrippino & 
Rey, 2018; Morais, Peydro & Ruiz, 2015; Nier et al., 2014; Rey, 2013; Shin, 2012; 
Terrones et al., 2011). This phenomenon of co-moving global capital flows has 
become known as the global financial cycle.  
                                                          
10 “Financial imbalances” refer to the growing fragility of private sector balance sheets that is driven by, 
but also feeds into, unsustainable economic expansions (Borio & Drehmann, 2009). They are 
associated with more persistent risk-taking during benign economic conditions, with a higher likelihood 
of widespread macro-financial instability. 
11 Such as misaligned investment. 
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Based on a structural interpretation of its negative relationship with the CBOE VIX, the 
global financial cycle may be regarded as a measure of aggregate volatility and time-
varying risk aversion in global financial markets. By construction, the VIX represents 
a measure of implied market volatility that reflects the aggregate degree of economic 
uncertainty and risk aversion. Measured by the implied volatility of S&P 500 index 
options, the VIX is often used to capture the degree of financial market strain based 
on investor uncertainty and risk aversion. Studies by Bruno and Shin (2015b), Cerutti 
et al. (2017), Forbes and Warnock (2012), Fratzscher (2012),Miranda-Agrippino and 
Rey (2018) and Rey (2013) all find a strong negative linear relationship between 
various global capital flows and the VIX. By contrast, Nier et al. (2014) find a 
conditional non-linear relationship for EMDEs, with the VIX appearing to become 
dominantly negative only during periods of high global uncertainty and risk aversion. 
While the effect may be conditional for EMDEs, this relationship does have significant 
implications for global leverage, credit growth and asset pricing. 
The global financial cycle may be characterised by the investment preferences and 
constraints of leveraged global banks and asset managers by including its negative 
relationship with the VIX in a theoretical model of heterogeneous investors (Adrian & 
Boyarchenko, 2018; Adrian & Shin, 2014; Brunnermeier & Sannikov, 2014; Bruno & 
Shin, 2015a; Etula, 2013; Lane & McQuade, 2014; Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2018; 
Reinhart & Reinhart, 2009; Rey, 2013; Zigrand, Danielsson & Shin, 2009). When 
global banks and asset managers become the main investors, the asymmetric 
interaction between their combined preferences and constraints tends to reduce risk 
aversion and premiums12 over time. On the one hand, value-at-risk (VaR) constrained 
global banks are assumed to be risk-neutral, implying a strong incentive for massive 
risk-taking and leveraging. On the other hand, standard mean-variance asset 
managers exhibit positive degrees of risk aversion, which limits their desire to 
leverage.  
All things being equal, low risk aversion tends to relax the VaR constraint, leading to 
increased bank borrowings. This tends to increase global asset demand and narrow 
lending spreads, which then places upward pressure on the global financial cycle (with 
                                                          
12 The risk premium is assumed to be dependent on the wealth distribution between leveraged global 
banks and asset managers, such as insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds or pension funds 
(Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2018). 
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the opposite being true during periods of high risk aversion). Therefore, a self-
reinforcing feedback loop may arise through the cross-border lending behaviour of 
global banks, with excessive risk-taking leading to domestic financial instability. This 
is confirmed by several studies that find strong cross-border transmission of financial 
instability from AEs to EMDEs through banking and other financial crises 
(Balakrishnan, Danninger, Elekdag & Tytell, 2011; Byrne & Fiess, 2016; Eichengreen, 
2000; Kabundi & Mbelu, 2017; Laeven & Valencia, 2013; Park & Mercado, 2014; 
Reinhart & Rogof, 2009).  
EMDEs tend to be long in US government debt (assets) and short in equities 
(liabilities). Therefore, balance sheets during crisis periods tend to be characterised 
by relatively stable or increasing assets, with decreasing liabilities. As investors in AEs 
respond to financial shocks with significant capital outflows, EMDEs with large external 
liabilities tend to experience substantial losses (Balakrishnan et al., 2011; Broner, 
Gelos & Reinhart, 2006). Moreover, based on the “volatility paradox”, rising asset 
prices may mask unsustainably expanding global bank balance sheets, which may 
weaken EMDE balance sheets (Brunnermeier & Sannikov, 2014; Miranda-Agrippino 
& Rey, 2018). Therefore, by signalling domestic balance sheet solvency and liquidity 
problems, the global financial cycle may create self-fulfilling investor expectations. 
With the US dollar being the currency of global banking, one may begin to question 
the role of US monetary policy in influencing the cost of global funding, the price of 
US-denominated external assets, and the provision of global credit. Specifically, global 
banks may be able to transmit US monetary policy shocks to domestic financial 
systems through the global financial cycle (Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2018; Morais et 
al., 2015; Shin, 2012). Testing this relationship, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2018) 
and Rey (2016) find strong evidence of powerful US monetary policy spill-overs 
through the global financial cycle.  
Using a large Bayesian VAR, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2018) find an unexpected 
tightening of the US federal funds rate to result in short-term real US contraction and 
dollar appreciation. As risk aversion rises over the medium term, US bank balance 
sheets contract, with reductions in domestic and international borrowing and leverage. 
This reduces global asset demand and prices, which raises global risk aversion and 
risk premiums. The global financial cycle then enters a downswing, as term spreads 
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narrow and the global external finance premium rises. Extending this analysis13 by 
considering the effects on national balance sheets in an environment with US-
denominated foreign debt, Rey (2016) finds that dollar appreciation tends to 
depreciate the domestic currency, resulting in an increase in the value of the US-
denominated balance sheet debt.  
Taking it a step further, expanding domestic bank balance sheet assets could 
stimulate domestic borrowing despite a recessionary environment. While this may 
provide an explanation for countercyclical credit cycles, it does suggest strong 
evidence of US monetary policy effects in potentially driving domestic procyclicality 
through the global financial cycle. Therefore, if US monetary policy changes represent 
a potential determinant of domestic financial cycles, current levels of EMDE debt may 
be explained by protracted depressed post-crisis global rates rather than underlying 
country-specific structural vulnerabilities (BIS, 2015). Moreover, it presents important 
challenges to standard international macro-financial theory.  
In an environment with large foreign balance sheet debt, domestic monetary policy 
faces a conflict between output and balance sheet stabilisation (Rey, 2016). Therefore, 
despite a floating exchange rate, the interest rate cannot be used alone as a policy 
tool to manage the prevailing conflict. Governed by the eponymous Mundellian 
trilemma theory, standard international macroeconomics assumes that policymakers 
face three desirable, though jointly unattainable, objectives: exchange rate stability, 
free capital mobility and nationally independent monetary policy (Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh & Taylor, 2005). This implies that floating exchange rates under liberal 
capital regimes14 are incapable of exporting monetary policy from the centre country 
to the periphery (Fleming, 1962; Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2018; Mundell, 1963; Rey, 
2016). However, with the presence of external balance sheet debt, the trilemma 
morphs into a ‘dilemma’, with the interest rate becoming a blunt tool. 
This challenges the assumption that dynamic monetary conditions can be shaped by 
the single use of a short-term policy rate. If this were true, the marginal freedom from 
exchange rate flexibility would be sufficient to neutralise any potential global spill-over 
                                                          
13 Rey (2016) follows the methodology of Gertler and Karadi (2015), who use an augmented VAR with 
high frequency identification (HFI) to test the response of credit costs through term premiums and credit 
spreads to monetary policy shocks. 
14 Including the assumption of uncovered interest parity (UIP). 
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effects. Despite implying a strong invalidation of the trilemma theory, the model 
remains an important guideline for understanding the true severity of policy 
constraints. Therefore, the benevolent and prudent policymaker must consider any 
additional policy conflicts within the context of changes to external foreign currency 
balance sheet debt. 
Macroeconomic Policy Implications 
National alternatives to global transmission management  
Based on the above discussions, financial vulnerabilities tend to build up over time 
and reflect the self-reinforcing interaction between the financial and real sector. While 
a closed system with credit market frictions may explain a portion of domestic 
procyclicality, it is not sufficient to generate large waves of instability, which tend to 
become systemic. By extending FA models to include the role of international frictions, 
empirical studies have shown a growing role for international credit and risk-taking 
frictions in domestic credit procyclicality (Eichengreen, 2001; Kose, Otrok & Whiteman, 
2003; Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2018; Obstfeld, 2009; Rey, 2016; World Bank, 2018). 
This provides evidence of the strength of cumulative processes in generating common 
risk factors, which will become more important as risks of faster paced US interest 
rates and dollar appreciation increase a decade after the crisis  
This raises questions of how monetary policy should incorporate financial objectives 
within its mandate to promote macroeconomic stability. While some authors argue for 
the explicit inclusion of a financial target within standard Taylor rule models, empirical 
studies have only shown minor deviations from standard models (Adrian & Shin, 2009; 
Agénor & Silva, 2013; Albulescu, Goyeau & Pépin, 2013; Baxa, Horváth & Vašíček, 
2013; Carlstrom, Fuerst & Paustian, 2010; Castro, 2011; Christiano, Motto & 
Rostagno, 2014; Curdia & Woodford, 2010; Issing, 2011; Ma & Zhang, 2016; Mishkin, 
2011; Woodford, 2012).  
Therefore, a substantial body of literature promotes the use of macroprudential 
measures to supplement traditional monetary policy (Aoki, Benigno & Kiyotaki, 2016; 
BCBS, 2010; Caruana, 2010; Farhi & Werning, 2016; Gameiro, Soares & Sousa, 
2011; Liu & Molise, 2016; SARB, 2016; White, 2009; Woodford, 2012). While Smets 
(2014), Svensson (2012) and Ueda and Valencia (2014) argue that dual objectives 
tend to reduce credibility, establishing clear and uniform policy rules may overcome 
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the time-inconsistency problem by sustaining credibility. Therefore, policymaking 
tends to incorporate financial objectives through a framework directed towards 
improving the measurement and management of macro-financial stability. 
Macroprudential policy represents one such framework, specifically designed to 
strengthen the financial system while limiting potential systemic risk (SARB, 2016). 
Consequently, it involves two broad components: identifying systemic risks and using 
various instruments to manage these risks. On the one hand, this requires a definite 
conceptualisation of systemic financial risk for the purpose of appropriate 
measurement and monitoring. On the other hand, it requires instruments that can 
reduce the potential of systemic risk while improving systemic resilience to unwanted 
shocks (Adrian et al., 2015; BCBS, 2010; Borio, 2012; Caruana, 2010; Karmakar, 
2016; Liu & Molise, 2018; SARB, 2016). 
Prior to the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, the optimal macroprudential policy 
involved addressing financial vulnerabilities before they became systemic. Rather than 
waiting to correct the effects of financial instability, policymakers assumed that 
‘pricking the bubble before it burst’ would adequately supress any unwanted 
outcomes. However, this is based on the perception that financial vulnerabilities are 
easily identified and can be controlled with a single instrument: the nominal interest 
rate (Blanchard, Dell Ariccia & Mauro, 2010). With the role of financial procyclicality in 
masking the systemic vulnerabilities that led to the 2007/2008 crisis, macroprudential 
policy has evolved with a stronger focus on taking advantage of potentially 
destabilising imbalances. As such, macroprudential instruments are now guided by 
the philosophy of building up provisions during upswings that may be drawn down 
during downswings. Known as ‘leaning against the wind’, this approach focuses on 
leaning against cyclical amplifications to build up provisions that can then be used to 
reinforce the system against negative shocks. 
Therefore, instruments are designed to strengthen the macro-financial system against 
negative aggregate shocks while simultaneously leaning against financial imbalances 
that tend to amplify the financial cycle. Therefore, successful macroprudential policy 
involves identifying systemic risks and using instruments based on building up 
provisions during good times that may be drawn down during bad times, i.e. ‘leaning 
against the wind’ (Borio, 2012; Erdem & Tsatsaronis, 2013). This requires the 
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combination of four types of policy responses focused on the build-up of systematic 
risk from common domestic and global movements: (1) improved risk measurement; 
(2) a set of supervisory rules; (3) a set of supervisory instruments; and (4) the 
complementary use of monetary, fiscal and macroeconomic policy. 
(1) Improved risk measurement 
Generally defined as the likelihood of system-wide financial destabilisation, systemic 
risk comprises both cyclical and structural risk. While cyclical risk refers to the time 
dimension of systematic risk,15 structural risk refers to the cross-sectional 
concentration within the financial system that may propagate cyclical risk. Therefore, 
the goal is to find measures that can capture both current and expected vulnerabilities 
based on cyclical risk. As previously discussed, the BCBS (2010) credit cycle 
represents one such measure of cyclical risk. Calculated as the deviation of the credit-
to-GDP ratio from its long-term trend, the cycle is extracted using a one-sided Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing parameter of 400 00016 (BCBS, 2010; Drehmann 
& Tsatsaronis, 2014; Giese, Andersen, Bush, Castro, Farag & Kapadia, 2014). Despite 
extensive use, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014), Farrell (2016) and Hamilton (2017) 
argue that the gap lacks formal economic specification.  
Using a one-sided filter implies a backward-looking (recursive) trend, which only takes 
information up to the end point into account. This is shown to result in artificially 
generated trends and cycles with future values that are forecasted from lagged values. 
This assumes that financial variables should follow an unpredictable random walk, 
while most tend to be non-stationary (Hamilton, 2017; Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 
2018). To overcome this problem, Hamilton (2017) suggests an alternative approach 
that redefines the HP cyclical component according to the Beveridge and Nelson 
(1981) characterisation. By assuming stationarity within a non-finite (rather than finite) 
forecast horizon, the cycle may be extracted from the actual data-generating cyclical 
factors from several financial variables. 
                                                          
15 Cyclical risk also includes a non-systematic (idiosyncratic) component that is specific to each variable 
or sector in the financial system; however, the focus of this study is on the common factors that 
propagate the correlation among variables. 
16 Normally, the smoothing parameter is set to 1 600 for quarterly data, for no methodological reason. 
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Another approach that can be used involves redefining the trend, rather than the 
cyclical component. Using an unrestricted (UR) Morley, Nelson and Zivot (2003) 
correlated unobserved components (UC) model, Grant and Chan (2017) modify the 
HP trend as a second-order Markov (2M) process with a drift. Grant and Chan (2017) 
demonstrate the flexibility of the UCUR-2M model in allowing for both time-varying 
trend growth and reducing the assumptions required for cyclical generating processes. 
Alternatively, Farrell and Kemp (2017) use a multivariate UC time series model (TSM) 
to estimate the South African financial cycle. Based on the statistical approach of 
Harvey and Trimbur's (2003) UCTSM, Farrell and Kemp (2017) use the Kalman filter 
to extract the trend and cyclical components from the series. By modelling the trend 
and cycle as UCs within a structural TSM framework, this approach implicitly defines 
filters that are consistent with the data. Moreover, UCTSMs overcome the end of 
sample problem by automatically adapting to the end of the sample (Harvey & Trimbur, 
2003).  
While these approaches represent significant measurement improvements, further 
research is required to provide stronger empirical justification over the HP filter. For 
example, the main difference between Grant and Chan's (2017) UCUR-2M model and 
the HP filter is a slightly more persistent gap at some cost to fitness. Moreover, the 
significant difference between filtering techniques and the UCTSM model used by 
Farrell and Kemp (2017), is the end-of-sample problem. Therefore, despite some 
shortcomings, the standard HP filter remains one of the strongest empirically tested 
methods for characterising cyclical risk, especially for systemic stress arising from 
individual sectors.  
(2) A set of supervisory rules  
Next, policymakers need to establish a set of supervisory rules aimed at cyclically 
limiting the sources of systematic risk build-up, i.e. excessive credit and leverage 
growth (Borio et al., 2001; Rey, 2013). These could either be mechanically designed 
to respond to risk measures like the credit gap, or more judgement-based, such as 
balance sheet stress testing. Currently, the BCBS (2010) uses the credit gap as a 
common reference guide for implementing the mechanically based countercyclical 
capital buffer (CCB). While such rules tend to remain relatively immune to political 
lobbying, the mechanism relies heavily on the assumption of credit procyclicality.  
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As previously discussed, failure of this assumption to hold results in credit 
countercyclicality, which implies increasing capital requirements during downswings, 
while decreasing them during upswings. Therefore, mechanical application of rule-
based measures may end up amplifying the build-up of a crisis. Rather than discarding 
such measures, this provides strong justification for the supplementary use of 
judgement-based measures (BCBS, 2010; Drehmann & Tsatsaronis, 2014; Farrell, 
2016; Liu & Molise, 2018; SARB, 2011; Van Vuuren, 2012). One option is either broad-
based or more targeted financial sector balance sheet stress-testing. With a strong 
focus on financial accelerator transmission, stress tests involve large simulations that 
assess whether changes in financial variables pose a significant threat to financial 
stability. Despite the unpopular requirement of regular reporting and complementary 
fiscal credibility, regular stress tests have the advantage of revealing potential 
weaknesses in areas such as corporate governance (Rey, 2013). 
(3) A set of supervisory instruments   
Selecting policy instruments involves addressing the various sources of systematic 
risk build-up arising from common movements in variables like banking sector capital, 
leverage, liquidity, maturity mismatches or global balance sheet linkages (Rey, 2013; 
SARB, 2016). With that in mind, Basel III has designed an arsenal of instruments that 
fall into three general categories: capital-based, asset-side and liquidity-based 
instruments. 
Capital-based Instruments  
The most prominent capital-based instrument based on banking sector solvency is 
Basel III’s CCB. CCBs are designed to ensure adequate capital levels to maintain the 
flow of credit during periods of systemic stress (BCBS, 2010; Bernstein et al., 2016; 
Liu & Molise, 2018). As previously mentioned, activation is based on an automatic rule 
that uses a threshold to determine whether increases (or decreases) in minimum 
capital requirements are necessary. During upswings (downswings), this involves 
potentially raising (lowering) capital requirements to influence the cost of bank capital 
and supply of credit. While the CCB has strong advantages in its ability to overcome 
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optimism bias17 while building up provisions, it may result in the unnecessary build-up 
of excess capital reserves. 
Vallageas (2013) challenges the appropriateness of capital requirements by stressing 
the distinction between deposit banks (which create money) and other financial entities 
(which do not). The mechanics of capital requirements come from the assumption that 
bank capital is crucial for securing liabilities. While this might be true for non-financial 
industrial firms, it may not be true for money-creating institutions. Therefore, Vallageas 
(2013) argues that bank capital is effectively redundant, with excessive build-ups 
leading to systemic securitisation like that which led to the recent crisis. While this 
argument highlights the risks of excessive capital build-ups, it may be overcome by 
improved timing of policy activation administered by designated disciplinary boards. 
To that end, macroeconomic policy has made a major step in developing Twin Peaks 
regulatory structures comprising designated authorities for market and prudential 
control respectively (South African National Treasury, 2018; SARB, 2015). Following 
Australia, the Netherlands, the UK and Canada, South Africa has adopted a Twin 
Peaks regulatory framework through the Financial Services Regulation Act No. 9 of 
2017. Specifically, the Act aims to support financial stability through specific authorities 
that manage market risk and prudential policy separately. Replacing the Financial 
Services Board, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA) focuses on managing 
business conduct and consumer protection. Operating through the SARB, the 
Prudential Authority (PA) focuses on managing financial stability. Therefore, with 
strong regulatory structures in place, capital-based instruments provide strong policy 
alternatives.  
Asset-side Instruments 
Given the relationship between credit and asset prices, Basel III has designed the 
leverage ratio (LR) as a non-risk-based instrument to restrict excessive balance sheet 
lending. Measured as the proportion of capital exposure to both on- and off-balance 
sheet items, higher (lower) LR ratios than a certain threshold during upswings 
(downswings) result in increased (decreased) capital requirements, especially for 
large off-balance sheet exposure. Additionally, instruments such as loan-to-value 
                                                          
17 Bias towards inaction when good times are unfolding, and everyone is happily sharing the dividends 
of increasing asset returns, forgetting about the risk building up (Rey, 2013). 
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(LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios may be used. However, unlike the LR, these 
measures may be subject to biases such as reporting standards and tax incentives 
(Rey, 2013). 
Another promising instrument developed by Drehmann and Juselius (2012) focuses 
on capturing joint credit, property price and interest rate dynamics to estimate the risk 
of relative debt unsustainability. By assuming that a given lending rate equates debt 
service costs18 to maturity, economy-wide debt service ratios (DSRs) are measured 
by the proportion of aggregate private sector fixed debt service costs to GDP. While 
DSR ratios may be appropriate for targeted vulnerabilities, further research is required 
from the perspective of systematic risk effects.   
Liquidity-based Instruments 
To protect the banking sector against potential liquidity outflows during periods of 
financial stress, Basel III proposes the countercyclical liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). Specifically, these ratios measure the 
proportion of high-quality credit and liquidity assets that are needed to cover net 
liquidity outflows during specific time periods of stress (BCBS, 2013, 2014). While the 
LCR focuses on improving short-term liquidity resilience by matching liquid assets to 
outflows, the NSFR focuses on longer term resilience by requiring more stable sources 
of funding on an ongoing structural basis. Given the consequences manipulating the 
liquidity shortage, these instruments are advisable only when specific vulnerabilities 
exist. 
Alternative Instruments 
A growing body of literature has begun to consider the practical implementation of 
alternative tools, such as equity inflow taxes and macroprudential stability levies. 
Using a model with nominal rigidities, market incompleteness and foreign currency 
debt, Farhi and Werning (2016) find taxing foreign currency debt to be an optimal 
macroprudential tool, especially for EMDEs. Moreover, leverage caps on forex 
derivatives and taxes on non-core forex liabilities have proven efficient for EMDEs with 
certain country-specific dynamics (Chamon & Garcia, 2016; Farhi & Werning, 2016; 
Forbes, Fratzscher, Kostka & Straub, 2011; Rey, 2013). Given the changing dynamics 
                                                          
18 Calculated as interest and repayments. 
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of aggregate cross-border debt flows in EMDEs, further research on country-specific 
benefits and costs of such instruments would be highly valuable.  
(4) The complementary use of monetary, fiscal and macroeconomic policy  
Any consideration of macroprudential policy implementation should involve an 
assessment of the viability of monetary and fiscal policy measures as complementary 
tools (Borio et al., 2001; Rey, 2013). To the extent that procyclicality stems from 
inappropriate risk responses, the scope for application should remain within the 
context of national macroeconomic policy, and instruments chosen on the basis of 
addressing specific vulnerabilities. 
Monetary Policy 
Empirical literature testing the Mundellian trilemma theory tends to focus on co-
movements between domestic and centre-country policy rates across exchange rate 
regimes. Monetary independence is then proven by low or no co-movement between 
the two policy rates. However, while short-term policy rates tend to be less correlated 
under floating regimes when capital is freely mobile, this does not provide sufficient 
proof of autonomy in an environment with foreign debt (Goldberg, 2013; Klein & 
Shambaugh, 2015; Obstfeld, 2015; Obstfeld et al., 2005; Rey, 2016).Therefore, policy 
tightening or foreign currency intervention may remain applicable under certain 
circumstances. 
While monetary policy is less effective in mitigating balance sheet recessions,19 it may 
be used to support balance sheet repair through exchange rate depreciation (Borio, 
2012; Rey, 2016). When debt is not dominated by foreign currency, reduced reserves 
or foreign currency sales may temporarily boost output and cash flows. However, it 
may be perceived to have beggar-thy-neighbour connotations and result in unwelcome 
exchange rate and capital flow pressures, especially among commodity-exporting 
EMDEs. Therefore, policymakers should pay close attention to the changing 
composition of external foreign currency-denominated debt in domestic banking sector 
balance sheets.  
                                                          
19 When the private sector is overly indebted, monetary policy is less likely to be an effective tool for 
stimulating balance sheet recessions (Borio, 2012). 
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Alternatively, policymakers may consider the controversial use of capital controls to 
insulate domestic financial movements from global spill-overs. While there is no 
consensus regarding the effect of permanent controls, temporary controls on cross-
border credit and portfolio debt have proven effective where large cross-border 
leverage occurs in unsustainable asset markets (Rey, 2013). Since macroprudential 
policies may weaken the link between domestic monetary policy and capital flows 
without any controls,20 temporary targeted capital controls should rather be viewed as 
a partial substitute for severe crisis episodes.  
Fiscal and Macroeconomic Policy 
Ideally, effective macroprudential policy involves the reduction of buffers during 
recessions that were built up during economic expansions. During upswings, 
temporary restrictive fiscal measures could be used to contain the optimism bias 
associated with overstating potential output estimates. Failure to implement such 
measures may require using public sector balance sheets to support banking sector 
balance sheet repair. While the main fiscal policy challenge involves avoiding a 
sovereign crisis, healthy public finances could be used to establish a self-sustaining 
economic recovery during recessionary periods (Borio, 2012). However, highly 
indebted public finances should prioritise crisis management to avoid additional 
pressure on systemic risk.  
Since large fiscal deficits can amplify global spill-over effects, policymakers require 
reforms that help reduce domestic procyclicality and increase resilience to potential 
global shocks (Frankel, 2017; World Bank, 2018). This could be done by realigning 
public spending towards growth-enhancing investments and managing the changing 
composition of external debt. This may stabilise public debt levels and ease tax 
burdens by generating additional fiscal revenues. Therefore, fiscal policy choices 
should be guided by overarching macroeconomic policy that aims to establish long-
term fiscal sustainability (Callen et al., 2014; Halland, Noel, Tordo & Kloper-Owens, 
2017; Hesse, 2008; Mendes & Pennings, 2017; World Bank, 2018). 
Given the expected changes in global demand, resource-rich commodity-exporting 
countries should consider macroeconomic policy guided by export diversification to 
                                                          
20 Specifically, all else being equal, a domestic tightening coupled with sound macroprudential policy 
should reduce the external finance premium.  
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improve longer term growth and resilience to global shocks. Resource revenues can 
then be reallocated towards well-managed strategic investment funds (SIFs) that 
create investment opportunities, deepen capital markets, and build state capacity as 
a professional long-term investor. However, such policies should be complemented by 
additional measures that foster human and physical capital development, improve 
institutional governance and enhance regional competitiveness. 
Taken together, the literature suggests a growing role for external balance sheet debt 
in determining the procyclicality of domestic financial cycles. While consensus exists 
regarding the presence of a distinct domestic financial cycle, the question of 
appropriate characterisation remains open. Despite some methodological challenges, 
the credit-to-GDP gap remains the strongest empirically tested measure of systemic 
risk emanating from private sector imbalances. However, the most comprehensive 
measure appears to involve the combination of a set of variables that characterise the 
entire financial system.  
Moreover, distinguishing between phases of the domestic financial cycle and its 
relationship to the business cycle is crucial for informing the selection and use of 
macroprudential policies. Policies may function differently depending on the 
relationship between the two cycles, with macroprudential tools becoming less 
effective during corresponding downswings, especially when credit is countercyclical. 
Understanding this relationship becomes more pertinent with growing evidence of a 
global financial cycle that may partly transmit US monetary policy to national financial 
systems. Therefore, policymaking requires an improved understanding of the 
determinants of domestic financial cycles. Specifically, the degree to which common 
domestic and global movements interact and potentially affect the amplification of real 
cycles through the systematic build up of risk needs to be analysed. 
Methodology 
The aim of this section is to provide a roadmap for analysing the determinants of the 
South African financial cycle. As mentioned earlier, the goal of this study is to 
investigate whether the South African financial cycle is isolated from global financial 
frictions. If not, we may be able to infer that rising domestic public sector debt levels 
may partly be attributed to post-crisis changes in global monetary policy. Based on the 
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literature, this requires insight into the systematic components of risk that may 
generate systemic risk. While a general description of systemic risk is sufficient for the 
literature, a more detailed description is required for empirical analysis.  
Following Borio et al. (2001) and De Bandt and Hartmann (2000), this study empirically 
defines systemic risk as the source-independent credit default risk that is faced by the 
entire domestic macro-financial system. The general assumption is that financial 
frictions are partly driven by aggregate perceptions of credit risk that arise from 
changes in asset values and financing constraints. This may cause build-ups of default 
risk by perceived nominal balance-sheet strength masking real financial distress. 
Therefore, systemic risk is characterised by build-ups of default risk during boom 
phases that are reflected by actual defaults during recessions. As discussed later, 
stronger positive correlations during downswings would provide evidence of credit 
procyclicality and a strong role for credit market frictions in generating significant 
systemic risk. 
If the credit and business cycles are not fully aligned, countercyclicality would provide 
strong evidence that systemic risk may be driven by other factors that influence the 
cyclical component of risk. Therefore, following Borio et al. (2001) and Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), this study empirically defines systematic risk as source-dependent risk 
driven primarily by forces that are common to the entire domestic macro-financial 
system. Given an open-economy framework, international diversification is assumed 
to reduce any remaining effects to residual and idiosyncratic (non-systematic).   
As mentioned in the previous section, there is no consensus on how these forces are 
assumed to drive the build-up of systematic risk over the business cycle. This is 
primarily due to empirical difficulties in defining cyclical movements, such as turning 
points or timing recessions (Aikman et al., 2015; Drehmann et al., 2012; Terrones et 
al., 2011). Based on the literature, three general approaches can be used to 
characterise a domestic cycle: turning-point approach, filtering techniques and factor-
analysis models. 
The turning point method is used to date the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) business cycles by identifying cyclical movements from the growth rates 
(trend deviation) of a set of variables (Ahking, 2014; Harding & Pagan, 2002). Pattern-
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recognition techniques21 are used to derive turning points that condense the 
movements into a single reference cycle subject to a set of censoring rules.22 Filtering 
techniques such as the HP filter, discussed in more detail below, use statistical filters 
to detrend the series and isolate cyclical patterns (Drehmann et al., 2012; Phillips & 
Jin, 2015). Despite wide empirical use, the statistical formalisation of both approaches 
tends to characterise financial cycles as unpredictable transitory shocks. While this 
may be appropriate for testing systemic procyclicality, it is not appropriate for 
characterising systematic risk build-up. Therefore, a third approach uses factor models 
to extract and decompose movements based on the systematic build-up of time-
varying cyclical risk. 
Within this framework, systemic risk is assumed to have a systematic component, 
which is a function of several stochastic risk factors23 that are common to the system, 
and an idiosyncratic component that is specific to various sectors within the system. 
For a given set of properties, the correlations between these factors can be defined 
as the sensitivity of each to the systematic (common) component and represented by 
factor loadings. Specifically, the factors are assumed to follow stochastic mean-
reverting processes, with loadings representing the response of each to common 
systematic movements characterised by well-defined, time-varying sequencing rather 
than an unpredictable random walk. 
Recall from the literature review that this study concentrates on one specific factor, 
which can be thought of as credit (leverage) default risk. The main implication of mean 
reversion is that the (conditional) probability of a downswing increases with the 
forecast horizon when the cycle is above trend.24 Assuming a normal probability 
distribution, this allows the time dimension of credit risk to be characterised by the 
relationship between asset prices and credit losses.25 This relationship has significant 
implications for the interpretation of factor loadings and correlations within the model.  
                                                          
21 Such as graphical or visual observation, or more commonly used algorithms like the Bry and Boschan 
(BB) algorithm. 
22 A set of rules that re-combine the turning points to satisfy pre-determined criteria concerning the 
duration and amplitudes of phases and complete cycles (Harding & Pagan, 2002). 
23 Stochastic properties describe a type of mathematical rule that governs the probability of movement 
of time-series variables. 
24 This implication holds irrespective of the causal mechanisms behind the cycle. 
25 This arises from the conceptual definition of credit losses: the probability of default (credit risk) or loss 
given default (asset-to-debt risk). 
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Firstly, the assumption of more persistent mean-reverting credit losses implies a 
loading premium during recessions. During downswings, when asset prices are 
relatively lower than debt, the probability of defaults (reflected by high factor loadings) 
will be high. Similarly, loss given default would increase, with asset values closer to 
insolvency for debt backed by procyclical collateral. Secondly, the conditional 
probability26 of default risk implies higher correlations of credit losses during 
recessions. Therefore, this implies higher correlations among expected and 
unexpected losses, reflected by higher asset price volatility and default probability. 
The opposite would be true during upswings i.e. low factor loadings and correlations. 
With that in mind, this study conducts the analysis in two stages: (1) measuring the 
domestic credit cycle as source of systemic risk and (2) measuring the domestic 
financial cycle as a measure of common systematic risk build-up.  
The Domestic Credit Cycle as Source of Systemic Risk  
Modelling the South African credit cycle  
Following the BCBS (2010), Bernstein et al. (2016), Borio (2012), Drehmann et al. 
(2011), Farrell (2016),  Giese et al. (2014) and Ng (2011), this study characterises 
domestic credit market frictions using the aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP gap 
as a measure for capturing systemic risk arising from private sector movements. As a 
methodology, the HP filter represents a smoothing method that extracts cyclical 
fluctuations from time series data (Drehmann et al., 2012; Phillips & Jin, 2015). 
Frequencies are then identified by a tuning (smoothing) parameter that is defined by 
the expected average duration of the cycle.  
The filter can be viewed as decomposing the time series 𝑦𝑡 into a smooth trend meant 
to capture the long-run growth, 𝜏𝑡, and a residual cyclical component, 𝑐𝑡, with a 
frequency determined by the smoothing parameter 𝜆: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑡                       (1) 
                                                          




The trend is then calculated by solving an optimisation problem chosen to minimise 
the sum of squared deviations of 𝑦𝑡 from 𝜏𝑡, plus the sum of squared second 
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𝑡=1 }                 (2) 
While the first summation penalises poorness of fit, the second summation penalises 
lack of smoothness through 𝜆, which weights the variation in 𝜏𝑡. It is assumed that, as 
𝜆 → 0, the trend converts to the series 𝑦𝑡; however, as 𝜆 → ∞, 𝜏𝑡 produces a series 
with a second difference of exactly zero (Hamilton, 2017). Therefore, the selection of 
lambda is critical in characterising the frequency of the cyclical component. 
While lambda is typically chosen as 𝜆 = 1 600 for quarterly time series, the empirical 
literature supports the use of 400 000 for capturing long-term trend behaviour 
(Drehmann & Tsatsaronis, 2014; Ravn & Uhlig, 2002). Since credit variables tend to 
have longer average cycle durations and frequencies, higher values of lambda are 
more appropriate. Moreover, Borio and Lowe (2002) and the BCBS (2010) find 𝜆 = 
400 000 to perform best in capturing private sector indebtedness. Therefore, this study 
will use a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with the smoothing parameter 𝜆 set to 
400 000. 
The Domestic Financial Cycle as a Measure of Systematic Risk  
Modelling the South African financial cycle 
Following Hatzius et al. (2010), Igan et al. (2011), Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2018), 
Ng (2011) and Stock and Watson (2016), this study uses a dynamic factor model 
(DFM) to characterise the systematic build-up of credit default risk in the South African 
financial system. As discussed previously, factor models assume that the common 
dynamics of several variables are driven by a few latent (unobservable) factors. The 
cyclical component is extracted by exploiting these co-movements and weighting each 
according to the similarity of common fluctuations. Therefore, each factor is assumed 
to exhibit a mean-reverting structure determined by an idiosyncratic component 
specific to each sector, and a common systematic component irrespective of sector.  
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Following the literature, this can be expressed by a 𝑁 × 1 vector of observed time 
series variables 𝑌𝑡 = (𝑦1𝑡, 𝑦2𝑡 , … , 𝑦𝑁𝑡)′, dependent on a common component 𝑋𝑡 =
(𝑥1𝑡, 𝑥2𝑡, … , 𝑥𝑁𝑡)′ and an idiosyncratic component 𝐸𝑡 = (𝜀1𝑡, 𝜀2𝑡, … , 𝜀𝑁𝑡)′: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡                      (3) 
where 𝑌𝑡 represents a collection of stationary demeaned variables chosen to represent 
the entire macro-financial system. 𝑋𝑡 is assumed to be driven by a small number of 
unobservable (𝐹𝑡) factors that are common to 𝑌𝑡 and orthogonal to 𝐸𝑡, which is 
assumed to be driven by sector-specific factors. Therefore, 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐹𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡,                     (4) 
with 𝐹𝑡 = (𝑓1𝑡, 𝑓2𝑡 , … , 𝑓𝑘𝑡)′ comprising a vector of contemporaneously orthogonal 𝑘 
number of common factors loaded by an 𝑁 × 𝑘 matrix, 𝐴 = (𝑎′1, 𝑎
′
2, … , 𝑎
′
𝑁)′, 
representing the coefficients (loadings) that determine the reaction (sensitivity) of each 
to the common factors. Therefore, the matrix 𝐴 is used to weight the systematic 
variation among factors (𝑓𝑡) with the common movement captured by 𝐹𝑡. By 
construction, 𝑘 ≪ 𝑁, with 𝐹𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡 allowed to exhibit weak cross-sectional correlation 
(Chamberlain & Rothschild, 1982; Hatzius et al., 2010; Igan et al., 2011; Stock & 
Watson, 2016). 
By applying the law of large numbers (𝑁, 𝑇 ⟶ ∞), the system can then be modelled 
by estimating 𝐹𝑡 as the first principal component of 𝑋𝑡. Through cross-sectional 
averaging, principal component analysis (PCA) removes the idiosyncratic component 
𝐸𝑡, and minimises the sum of square deviations of the common component from the 
individual factors (𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝐴)(𝐹𝑡) ∑ (𝐹𝑡 − 𝐴
′𝐹𝑡)(𝐹𝑡 − 𝐴𝐹𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ). The problem is solved by 
calculating the first 𝑘 eigenvalues and eigenvectors from the sample variance-
covariance matrix, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡), defined as: 
𝐴𝐹𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉′𝑌𝑡           (5) 
Since the factor loadings 𝐴 represent the variance 𝑉, the equation can be written as: 
𝐹𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑉′𝑌𝑡           (6) 
 35 
 
Following Forni, Giannone, Lippi and Reichlin (2009), Igan et al. (2011), Miranda-
Agrippino and Rey (2018) and Ritschl, Sarferaz and Uebele (2016), this study uses an 
approximate dynamic specification with the assumption that the common factors and 
idiosyncratic terms are zero-mean processes characterised by lagged finite 
dependence. DFMs form part of a class of hidden Markov models that specify the 
evolution of latent factor dynamics, 𝐹𝑡, as lagged 𝑉𝐴𝑅 (𝑝) process:   
𝐹𝑡 = Φ1𝐹𝑡−1 + ⋯ + Φ𝑝𝐹𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜐𝑡,         (7) 
with a collection of autoregressive coefficients (Φ1, … , Φ𝑝) in a 𝑘 × 𝑘 matrix Φ, and 
normally distributed error term 𝜐𝑡. 27 The idiosyncratic component, 𝐸𝑡  (𝑖. 𝑒. 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡), is 
then assumed to capture any residual autocorrelation through a collection of 
independent univariate AR processes, 
𝐸𝑡 = 𝜌𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡,           (8) 
with 𝜂𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑁
2) and 𝔼(𝜂𝑡, 𝜂𝑠) = 0. Based on an initial value of 𝐹0, the common 
movement in 𝐹𝑡 can then consistently be estimated up to a scale by summing over the 
squared loadings from the first 𝑘 principal component solutions. Therefore, the number 
of factors (𝑘) requires specification. While the empirical determination remains an 
open question, several approaches exist,28 with the most widely used being the Bai 
and Ng (2002) information criteria (IC). 
Information criteria are used to penalise an objective function by creating a trade-off 
between the cost of increased sampling variability and the benefit of an additional 
parameter. Extending this idea, Bai and Ng (2002) propose an estimate of 𝑘 that 
minimises the objective function (equivalent to the maximised mean 𝑅2) subject to a 
penalty function that increases with 𝑘, such that: 
𝐼𝐶(𝑘) = 𝑙𝑛𝑉(𝑘, ?̂?𝑡) + 𝑘𝑔(𝑁, 𝑇),         (9) 
with 𝑙𝑛𝑉(𝑘, ?̂?𝑡) representing the objective least-squares minimisation function and 
𝑔(𝑁, 𝑇) the penalty function for overfitting. Since 𝑔(𝑁, 𝑇) vanishes at a rate that does 
                                                          
27 Also assumed to follow a zero-mean process 
28 See Stock and Watson (2016) for a discussion of alternative approaches. 
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not permit under- and over-parameterisation, efficiency is maintained,29 as 𝑘 is chosen 
to best capture the variations in 𝑋𝑡 that estimate the loadings. By generalising the 𝐶𝑝 
criteria of Mallows (1973), Bai and Ng (2002) specify the penalty, 𝐶𝑁𝑇 = {√𝑁, √𝑇}, as 
a function of both 𝑁 and 𝑇. Assuming that ?̂?2 is a consistent estimate of 𝑉(𝑘, ?̂?𝑡), it 
then becomes the required penalty-scaling term implied by the logarithmic 
transformation of the objective function, represented as: 

















Along with the first 𝑘 eigenvalues (arranged in decreasing order) of the variance-
covariance matrix, the above criteria will then be used to select the appropriate number 
of factors to include within the analysis.  
Data and Data Transformations 
The South African aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP gap 
Calculated as the deviation of the private sector credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-term 
trend, the credit-to-GDP gap is used to capture excessive credit movements relative 
to economic growth. Following the BCBS (2010), the broad measure of total credit 
extended by all monetary institutions to the domestic private sector is used to allow for 
the inclusion of all sources of private credit. The ratio is then calculated using nominal 




⁄ ) × 100%. 
Both variables are nominal, seasonally adjusted prior to calculation and taken in 
quarterly frequency over the period 1980Q1 to 2016Q4. The gap is then calculated as 
                                                          
29 Efficiency is lost when more factor loadings are estimated (Bai & Ng, 2002). 
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the deviation of the ratio from its long-term trend using the HP filter as described 
above, and decomposed as follows: 
𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 = 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡 − 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡, 
with 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 representing the long-run sustainable average of the credit-to-GDP ratio 
and 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 representing the medium-term cyclical component. As discussed previously, 
credit extension is assumed to be procyclical, therefore the expectation is for the gap 
to increase during business cycle upswings and decrease during downswings. This 
will be judged by comparing the gap to SARB business cycle dates and the correlation 
coefficient to the South African business cycle. Following Bernstein et al. (2016), the 
business cycle is proxied by the South African coincident indicator and calculated with 
quarterly averages, using the HP filter with the standard smoothing parameter for 
quarterly data of 1 600.  
The South African financial cycle 
Following the literature, the financial cycle will be constructed using 12 financial 
variables that influence economic behaviour, capture risk sentiment and fall within the 
six main sectors of the financial system: credit, equity, real estate, foreign exchange, 
funding, and global (Hatzius et al., 2010; Kabundi & Mbelu, 2017; Ng, 2011; Oet et al., 
2012). Additionally, the real sector will be incorporated using the single-measure real 
GDP as a macroeconomic variable (Borio, 2012; Drehmann et al., 2012). Below is a 
brief description of variables in each sector, while a complete list of variables, sources 
and treatment are included in Appendix Table A. 
Credit Market 
The credit market is captured by three variables: the private sector credit30-to-GDP 
ratio, term spread (government bonds 10 years and over – 0 to 3 years), and corporate 
bond spread (Eskom bonds – government bonds 0 to 3 years). Unlike the ‘gap’, which 
is more sensitive to structural changes such as financial deepening, the ‘ratio’ captures 
excessive credit movements relative to GDP while assuming a constant long-term 
trend in the relationship (Drehmann et al., 2012). Lending spreads are used to capture 
                                                          




the degree of credit market risk as the economy’s average cost of borrowing31 
(Drehmann et al., 2012; Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2018). The expectation is that 
financial cycle upswings are characterised by low default risk. This should be 
evidenced by narrow credit spreads, and rising credit relative to GDP. 
Asset Market 
The asset market includes both the equity market and the real estate market. The 
equity market is represented by equity prices, the SAVI and bank volatility. Equity 
prices are captured using the IMF IFS South African Share Price Index.32 The SAVI 
and the JSE financials volatility indexes are used to capture the aggregate degree of 
market-risk aversion. The expectation is that financial upswings should be 
characterised by low default risk aversion, reflected in low equity price volatility. 
However, equity prices tend to perform poorly over the medium term due to higher 
volatilities (Borio, 2012; Drehmann et al., 2012; Giese et al., 2014). Therefore, this 
study includes a measure of the real estate market to capture movements in general 
asset prices. The real estate market is captured by the ABSA house price index, with 
the expectation of rising asset to credit reflected by low house price volatility (Terrones 
et al., 2011).  
Funding Market   
The funding market is represented by the South African JIBAR, banking sector 
leverage and M2 money supply.33 JIBAR will be used to measure the cost of liquidity 
by the average cost of raising short-term funds in the banking sector (Drehmann et al., 
2012). Banking sector leverage is calculated as the ratio of total bank assets to total 
bank equity and is used to capture the risk of excessive on- and off-balance sheet 
leverage (BCBS, 2017). Drawing from a more neoclassical relationship, real money 
growth is included to capture changes in broad money supply. The expectation is that, 
during an upswing, low default risk evidenced by high assets to equity will lower 
liquidity costs and raise money supply. 
                                                          
31 Lending spreads may additionally be used as a policy anchor tool that seeks to smooth out funding 
costs (Drehmann et al., 2012). 
32 The SARB JSE All Share Index only has data from 1985, while IMF IFS data covers the full sample. 
33 CDS spreads were initially considered as a measure of banking sector funding risk; however, it was 
excluded due to bias caused by a high correlation with the cumulated factor. 
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Foreign Exchange Market 
The forex market is included to account for exchange rate frictions and represented 
by the real effective exchange rate (Borio & Lowe, 2002). The expectation is that 
upswings are characterised by currency appreciations reflecting capital inflows, and 
low degrees of currency mismatch risk. If capital flows reflect rising credit inflows and 
lowering values of external debt, this could provide evidence of global frictions 
affecting the domestic cycle. 
Global Market 
Finally, global commodity prices are used to explicitly capture changes in global 
demand. As a commodity-exporting EMDE, the South African financial cycle is 
expected to be influenced by changes in global commodity prices. Following Miranda-
Agrippino and Rey (2018) and Rey (2016), the expectation is that domestic financial 
cycle upswings are characterised by high domestic GDP sustained by rising 
commodity prices. This reduces domestic default risk and lowers global risk aversion. 
This should be reflected in a rising financial cycle, with rand appreciation implying 
dollar depreciation and decreasing values of external debt. To provide evidence of this 
transmission mechanism, this study will examine the correlation between the 
constructed South African financial cycle and the global financial cycle and VIX 
respectively.  
This study will use the Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2018) measure of the global 
financial cycle and the CBOE VIX collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint 
Louis Economic Database (FRED). All other data is collected from the SARB, INET 
BFA and IMF IFS (Appendix Table A). All series are taken at quarterly frequency using 
end-of-quarter values spanning the period 1980Q1 to 2016Q4 to provide a sufficiently 
long sample to extract medium-term cycles. The series are deflated (where necessary) 
using the South African consumer price index, and seasonally adjusted34 and natural 
logarithms are used.35 Prior to estimation, all series are tested for unit roots and 
standardised by subtracting the mean and dividing by their respective standard 
deviations. 
                                                          
34 X-12 was used for removing the seasonal component of the series. 
35 Except for those series expressed in percentages. 
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Unit root tests  
Due to the unrealistic assumption of stationarity for most financial variables, the 
degree of integration is tested, and the series are transformed where necessary by 
differencing (Hamilton, 2017; Igan et al., 2011; Kabundi & Mbelu, 2017; Miranda-
Agrippino & Rey, 2018). Equation (4) is then transformed by ?̃?𝑡 ≡ ∆𝑦𝑡 denoting the 
first difference of any variable 𝑌𝑡: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝐴?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡 
The ERS unit root test and the KPSS unit root test will be used to test stationarity, with 
the ERS test used as a more powerful, generalised least-squares test and a null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity I(1). The KPSS test is then used as a robustness check, 
with a null hypothesis of stationarity I(0). Due to the tendency of time series data to 
exhibit a strong trend, the tests are carried out including both a constant and a 
deterministic trend36 (Igan et al., 2011). The Schwarz information criteria are used to 
select the number of lags, ensuring limited remaining serial correlation in the residuals. 
The results of unit root tests are presented in Appendix Table B. 
Empirical Results 
Based on the models presented in the previous section, this section proceeds to 
investigate the determinants of the South African financial cycle to determine whether 
it is isolated from global financial frictions or not. Firstly, domestic credit procyclicality 
is analysed to determine the contribution of private sector credit to generating systemic 
risk. This will provide insight into whether or not the South African financial cycle is 
driven by factors common to the entire system.  
Next, financial system procyclicality is analysed to disentangle common from 
idiosyncratic movements in driving the systematic build-up of credit default risk. 
Periods of excessive build-up will be determined over the sample period. This will be 
decomposed to determine (a) the response of each variable to changes in the common 
factor, and (b) the share of each variable’s contribution in driving common movements. 
The main driving forces are then analysed to determine whether common global 
                                                          
36 In cases of doubt, the analysis was repeated by excluding the trend and/or the constant from the null 
hypothesis (Igan et al., 2011). 
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factors may play a role in determining common domestic movements. This will be done 
by comparing the correlations between the South African financial cycle, the global 
financial cycle, and CBOE VIX. This will help to determine the degree of common 
versus idiosyncratic global movements in driving the systematic build-up of domestic 
credit default risk. Following the methodology, the analysis is presented in two 
sections: (1) the South African credit cycle and (2) the South African financial cycle. 
The South African Credit Cycle 
Private sector credit market frictions as a source of systemic risk  
As a measure of systemic risk arising from common private sector market frictions, 
Figure 1 presents the South African credit cycle over the period 1980 to 2016. 
Measured by the private sector credit-to-GDP gap, positive values above 0 imply 
above average build-ups of credit default risk, characterised by rising private sector 
credit extension. As discussed previously, rising credit extension is assumed to 
generate systemic risk through the build-up of credit default risk. Similarly, falling credit 
extension is assumed to reflect the realisation of this risk evidenced by actual credit 
defaults. 
 
Figure 1: South African aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP gap, 1980 to 2016 
Since 1980, South Africa has seen four periods of above-average private sector credit 
extension, with the gap widening from 1981 to 1986, 1988 to 1992, 1998 to 2000 and 
from 2006 to 2011. The first rise in credit extension appears to have been driven by 
the international gold price boom of the early 1980s. Despite relatively tight monetary 
policy, increases in gold and foreign reserves lowered the expected default risk, which 
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supported excess bank liquidity and credit extension (SARB, 1981). Peaking after four 
years, the credit cycle began turning, primarily due to actual defaults caused by the 
rapidly declining gold price (SARB, 1984). 
The next rise in above-average credit extension, from 1988 to 1992, was characterised 
by structural and regulatory changes in the funding sector. While banks were 
increasing their penetration into the mortgage loan market,37 policy shifts in the 
Deposit-Taking Institutions Act created increases in balance sheet deposits and 
assets38 (SARB, 1988, 1991). Peaking after two years, the credit cycle began 
decreasing, with defaults being realised due to low investor confidence caused by 
socio-political instability at the time.  
Coinciding with the Asian financial crisis (AFC), the third period, from 1998 to 2000, 
was characterised by firms switching from foreign to domestic sources of financing 
due to relative rand weakness at the time (SARB, 1999). Despite domestic monetary 
tightening, low default risk was further reinforced by capital market deepening and 
corporate restructuring during the time. While not evidenced in the credit cycle, the 
South African economy did not escape the spill-over effects from the AFC. In fact, it 
was the AFC that first revealed signs of the potential negative consequences of 
increased financial globalisation and the power of changing global market sentiment.  
While the turn of the millennium saw a decreasing gap, this occurred primarily due to 
regulatory changes concerning the reporting practices of corporate sector investment 
in derivatives (SARB, 2000). Nevertheless, following the global trend at the time, the 
South African credit cycle widened from 2006 to 2011 due to falling risk perception 
driven by rising asset values, primarily in the housing market. Once again displaying 
insensitivity to a tightening cycle in interest rates, the willingness of South African 
banks to extend credit increased to its highest level over the sample period. As 
securitisation entered the credit market during the lead-up to the crisis, rising asset 
prices propelled significant build-ups of private sector credit risk.  
Peaking in 2009, the South African credit cycle began responding to global liquidity 
concerns as systemic levels of actual credit defaults tightened global and domestic 
                                                          
37 While the mortgage loan market was dominated by mutual building societies, commercial banks 
began providing more flexible mortgage loans to consumers (Verhoef, 2017). 
38 Off-balance sheet items being recorded as conventional deposits and assets. 
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funding markets and raised debt-service costs (SARB, 2009). Along with risk 
mispricing, these results provide strong evidence for global and regulatory (structural) 
market changes being significant determinants of private sector credit movements in 
South Africa. However, this does not provide evidence of credit procyclicality. 
The correlation between the credit gap and South African business cycle is presented 
in Figure 2. As discussed previously, stronger, more positive correlations during 
downswings would provide evidence of procyclicality, with a strong role for credit 
market frictions in amplifying business cycle fluctuations. With an overall correlation 
coefficient between the two series of -0.360, it is evident that the South African credit 
cycle is weakly countercyclical. This suggests that the South African business cycle 
may lead aggregate private sector credit growth. Table 1 shows the SARB business 
cycle dates from January 1978 to the end of the sample, bearing in mind that the null 
of procyclicality is rejected by an increasing gap during real downswings. 
 
Figure 2: The South African business cycle and credit-to-GDP gap, 1980 to 2016 
Note: The South African business cycle is proxied by the South African coincident indicator. The SARB constructs 
the coincident business-cycle indicator by combining various equally weighted indicators of economic activity, 
including aggregate production, sales, income and employment indicators (Bernstein et al., 2016). The correlation 
coefficient between the two series is -0.360. 
While the credit gap was widening during the early 1980s, the business cycle was in 
a downward phase, interrupted only briefly by the short spending boom of 1983/1984. 
Despite real contraction from 1981 to 1986, credit extension continued to rise, driven 
primarily by increases in corporate sector overdrafts to finance involuntary inventory 
accumulation and supplement cash flows during the recession (SARB, 1984). The 
second credit gap increase, from 1988 to 1992, appears to coincide with an economic 
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downswing from 1989 to 1993, characterised by the previously discussed structural 
changes at the time. The third period, from 1998 during the AFC, coincides with an 
economic downswing from December 1996 to August 1999. Finally, despite higher 
lending rates and a business cycle downswing from 2007 to 2009, South African 
private sector credit extension rose significantly leading up to the GFC. 









Jan 1978 Aug 1981 15 Sept 1981 Mar 1983 6 
Apr 1983 Jun 1984 5 Jul 1984 Mar 1986 7 
Apr 1986 Feb 1989 12 Mar 1989 May 1993 17 
Jun 1993 Nov 1996 14 Dec 1996 Aug 1999 11 
Sept 1999 Nov 2007 33 Dec 2007 Aug 2009 7 
Sept 2009 Nov 2013 17 Dec 2013 Dec 2016* 12 
Source: (SARB, 2017b) 
* End of sample date 
In contrast to what is expected, the South African credit cycle appears to be weakly 
countercyclical, with a relatively low and negative correlation with the business cycle. 
This result is consistent with Bouvatier et al. (2014) and Repullo and Saurina (2011) 
for AEs, Drehmann and Tsatsaronis (2014) across a panel including EMDEs, and 
Bernstein et al. (2016) for South Africa, who all find cases of domestic credit 
countercyclicality. One potential explanation for this phenomenon may lie within the 
lead-lag relationships between the two variables in question, namely private sector 
credit and output. Specifically, studies find empirical evidence of credit cycles lagging 
output cycles, especially during economic contractions (Igan et al., 2011; Repullo & 
Saurina, 2011). 
During business cycle downswings, reduced cash flows may continue to stimulate 
private sector credit demand – through households attempting to smooth out 
consumption or businesses attempting to finance inventory accumulation (Gertler & 
Bernanke, 1995; Koivu, 2009). With higher credit relative to slower (or negative) GDP 
growth rates, this result may be amplified by the specification of how the credit-to-GDP 
gap is calculated. Specifically, using deviations of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its long-
term trend may increase the time it takes for the gap to return to average levels. 
Therefore, while financial accelerator theory assumes that credit market frictions 
amplify (and therefore lead) business cycle fluctuations, this may not be true for South 
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Africa. However, this can only be confirmed empirically by examining the lead-lag 
relationship between domestic credit and output. 
The South African Financial Cycle 
Systematic credit risk as a source of systemic risk  
As a reflection of systematic default risk arising from common movements in the entire 
system, Figure 3 presents the South African financial cycle from 1980 to 2016. As 
discussed previously, the macro-financial system is represented by 13 variables (see 
Appendix Table A) chosen to represent six interconnected sectors: credit, equity, real 
estate, funding, forex, and global markets. A DFM is used to capture the financial cycle 
using Bai and Ng's (2002) PC and IC criteria to determine the number of factors 
required to represent the common movements behind changes in systematic risk 
build-up. The outcome for the number of common factors is presented in Table 2. 
 
Figure 3: The South African financial cycle, 1980 to 2016 
Based on the results, the largest eigenvalue alone accounts for only 22% of the 
common variability in the data, with the IC criteria failing to converge with a maximum 
of 10 factors. Given the lack of convergence with the appropriate number to include, 
the number of factors was chosen based on the cumulative variance explained, using 
nine factors selected at a 10% level of significance. Each of the nine factors was then 
weighted by its corresponding eigenvalue and cumulated into a single factor by 
summing the factors over the sample period. Factor loadings were then obtained using 




Since the factor is standardised and assumed to represent the perception of credit 
(leverage) default risk, it is consistently estimated up to scale with a mean of 0, 
implying the average level of default risk caused by misperception. Therefore, positive 
values strictly above 0 may be interpreted as periods of rising default risk 
characterised by narrow lending spreads, rising credit-to-GDP, low asset price 
volatility, high banking sector leverage and money supply, low liquidity costs, and 
currency appreciations driven by rising commodity prices, resulting in higher GDP. 
Financial cycle downswings imply the opposite. 
As is evident from Figure 3, the South African financial cycle experienced six periods 
of above-average build-ups in default risk, potentially driven by common 
(mis)perceptions of risk: from 1980 to 1982, 1983 to 1984, 1986 to 1989, 1993 to 1996, 
1999 to 2003 and 2004 to 2008. Confirming the effects of the gold price boom, the 
financial cycle decreased from a peak during the early 1980s, reflecting actual losses 
incurred from the falling international gold prices at the time. As the gold price 
decreased, commodity prices decreased, along with South African asset prices and 
exports, which caused significant capital outflows and rand depreciation. Moreover, as 
gold and foreign reserves decreased, liquidity risks rose as funding contracted, which 
resulted in rising domestic credit costs and widening international lending spreads 
(SARB, 1982). 





𝑷𝑪𝒑𝟏 𝑷𝑪𝒑𝟐 𝑷𝑪𝒑𝟑 𝑰𝑪𝑷𝟏 𝑰𝑪𝑷𝟐 𝑰𝑪𝑷𝟑 
1 0.2150 0.7889     0.7892     0.7884    -0.0412    -0.0341    -0.0517 
2 0.3737 0.6405     0.6412     0.6396    -0.0594    -0.0451   -0.0803 
3 0.5035 0.5209     0.5219     0.5195    -0.0839    -0.0625    -0.1152 
4 0.6043 0.4302     0.4314     0.4283    -0.1030      -0.0744 -0.1447 
5 0.6935 0.3508     0.3524     0.3485    -0.1508    -0.1151    -0.2029 
6 0.7601 0.2940        0.2959 0.2912    -0.1881    -0.1452    -0.2506 
7 0.8221 0.2417 0.2439     0.2384    -0.2795    -0.2295    -0.3525 
8 0.8727 0.2008     0.2033     0.1970    -0.4061    -0.3490    -0.4895 
9 0.9164 0.1666     0.1695      0.1624 -0.6188    -0.5545    -0.7126 
10 0.9550 0.1376     0.1408     0.1329    -1.0302    -0.9587    -1.1344 
Note: For each value of 𝑘 the table shows the cumulative percentage of variance explained by the 𝑘-th eigenvalue 
(in decreasing order), the percentage of variance explained by the 𝑘-th eigenvalue (in decreasing order) and the 
value of the Bai and Ng (2002) 𝐼𝐶𝑝 criteria. 
Boosted by the stabilising gold price, the next above-average build-up in risk occurred 
over the 1983/1984 spending boom. As the gold price rebounded over the period, 
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expectations for stronger growth appeared to sustain lower expected default losses 
through increasing gold and foreign reserves and a stabilising currency (SARB, 1989). 
The third and fourth periods of systematic risk build-up during the late 1980s and early 
1990s were driven primarily by high socio-political instability that was driven by risk 
perception surrounding the democratic transition in South Africa in 1994. While higher 
than expected default losses drove capital outflows and rand depreciation, the 
successful implementation of structural adjustment policies appeared to stabilise the 
economy (SARB, 1997). 
Leading up to the AFC during the mid-1990s, systematic risk build-up was reflected 
by the under-estimation of regional default risk that drove EMDE asset markets and 
capital inflows. This build-up of risk was realised as the AFC erupted in 1997, 
characterised by large asset market losses and capital flow reversals. The rand 
depreciated as rising global risk aversion towards EMDEs stimulated further losses 
(SARB, 1998). As the global economy rebounded from the AFC, South Africa 
successfully attracted significant capital inflows over the early millennium period, from 
1999 to 2003 (SARB, 2001). As domestic equities outperformed Wall Street, under-
estimation of default risk drove international investment towards domestic corporate 
bonds. Moreover, government bond yields fell substantially as credit rating upgrades 
sustained lower perceptions of default risk. 
Despite rising asset and commodity prices sustaining the low perceptions of default 
risk, a massive rand depreciation in 2001 caused significant losses that only stabilised 
in 2003 (SARB, 2005). As a possible continuation of the millennial systematic build-up 
of default risk, the most recent upswing leading up to the 2008/2009 crisis appears to 
have been driven primarily by rising global asset prices. From 2004 to 2008, capital 
inflows were driven by a combination of strong commodity prices and low global risk 
aversion due to rising asset relative to debt values. As inflows were channelled 
towards rising domestic asset, house and equity prices, government bond yields fell 
as further credit rating upgrades boosted aggregate credit extension (SARB, 2007). 
While this cursory overview provides some insight into the South African financial 
cycle, the aim of adopting a composite measure is to investigate the determinants of 
common movements in driving systematic risk build-up. To this end, Table 3 presents 
the factor loadings and variance share decomposition of common movements based 
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on each variable’s contribution. As discussed previously, factor loadings represent the 
sensitivity (response) of each variable to movements in the common factor (risk 
perception), with higher loadings reflecting higher default probability. The variance 
share shows the contribution of each variable in driving changes in risk perception, 
with higher correlations reflecting higher probabilities of expected and unexpected 
losses. Moreover, while positive loadings indicate variables that increase with financial 
cycle expansion, negative loadings represent variables that increase during 
contractions. 
The estimates in Table 3 offer a few important insights into the co-movement of risk 
perception in propagating the South African financial cycle. Firstly, banking sector 
leverage, lending spreads, equity prices, commodity prices and money supply each 
account for more than a 95% share of common movements in risk perception. This 
implies that the South African financial cycle is driven mainly by common systematic 
changes in risk perception arising from frictions in the funding, credit, equity and global 
markets. 
Secondly, GDP, commodity prices and short-term interest rates have the highest 
factor loadings. This implies that real output, the global and short-term funding markets 
have the highest sensitivity to changes in the common factor. Stated more precisely, 
these sectors respond the most to common systematic changes in risk perception. 
Next, banking sector leverage and private sector credit have the lowest factor 
loadings, implying the lowest response to changes in the common factor. Finally, 
banking sector leverage, bank volatility and the SAVI have negative loadings, implying 
that these variables increase during financial cycle downswings. 
Taken together, the South African financial cycle represents the common systematic 
build-up of risk driven by the funding, credit, equity and global markets. Upswings 
(build-ups) emanate from low banking sector leverage risk driven by rising on- and off-
balance sheet debt assets relative to debt equity. This lowers the probability of default, 
which stimulates corporate bond issues and narrows spreads. Equity and commodity 
price volatility decrease as capital is redirected towards debt and credit markets that 
sustain growing money supply. As government bond issues rise and the term spread 
narrows, the cycle appears to be propagated by strong positive responses in economic 
growth and global commodity demand and monetary policy easing.  
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Table 3: Factor loadings and variance share decomposition of the common component 
Variables Factor loadings Variance share of 
common component 
Leverage ratio -0.041 0.985 
Corporate bond spread 0.110 0.973 
Equity prices 0.188 0.969 
Commodity prices 0.464 0.966 
Aggregate money 0.265 0.952 
Term spread 0.191 0.952 
JIBAR 0.423 0.922 
Bank volatility -0.207 0.906 
Real GDP 0.581 0.901 
House prices 0.368 0.881 
Exchange rate 0.225 0.850 
Private sector credit 0.094 0.844 
SAVI -0.280 0.813 
Note: Based on the cumulative variance explained in Table 2, nine factors were cumulated into one single 
standardised factor that is assumed to represent the perception of credit (leverage) default risk. Detailed treatment 
of variables can be found in Appendix Table A. Higher loadings reflect higher sensitivity (response) to common 
movements in the factor (risk perception). Positive loadings indicate variables that increase during upswings, while 
negative loadings represent variables that increase during contractions. Higher variance shares reflect higher 
contributions in driving common movements in risk perception through increased probability (correlation) of 
expected and unexpected losses.  
To confirm this transmission mechanism graphically, Figure 4 represents the variation 
in each main driving sector over the sample period. Generally, all sectors appear to 
respond as expected to corresponding upswings in the South African financial cycle. 
Default risk increases, and lending spreads narrows as expected during all six 
upswings over the sample. Conversely, money supply volatility increases as expected 
over all periods from the late 1990s, with unexpected decreases during the upswings 
over the early 1980s. Equity and commodity price volatility both appear moderate over 
the early upswing periods, with expected significant reductions in both following the 
2007/2008 crisis. However, high equity volatility is seen from 1998 to 2002, following 




Figure 4: The variation in each main driving force from 1980 to 2016 
To provide further insight into the propagation mechanisms, Figure 5 represents the 
correlation between the South African financial and credit cycles (discussed in the 
previous section). Confirming the low positive response of 9.4% (see Table 3) to 
changes in the common factor, the credit and financial cycles have a weak negative 
relationship. While it may be tempting to justify credit countercyclicality using the 
correlation coefficient of -0.34 (Table 4), closer inspection reveals that all above-
average credit periods coincide with financial cycle upswings, as is expected. 
Therefore, this relationship is more likely due to the higher frequency of the financial 
cycle, making it less smooth than the credit cycle.  
The credit gap widens during coinciding periods of low (but systematically increasing) 
default risk, characterised by financial cycle upswings from 1980 to 1998 and leading 
up to the 2008/2009 crisis. However, over the period 1999 to 2003, while the financial 
cycle is increasing, the credit gap is decreasing significantly. Together with 
unexpected equity volatility increases during this period, this may provide evidence of 
a possible idiosyncratic period from 1999 to 2003. Low money supply volatility in the 
early 1980s may be explained by the gradual policy shift away from targeting monetary 
aggregates. However, the case for credit and equity price volatility driven by 
idiosyncratic forces during the early 2000s is less clear. 
As discussed previously, the interaction between credit and asset markets forms a 
fundamental relationship for capturing the financial cycle. Property prices tend to 
perform better than equity over the medium term, with the latter being more 
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susceptible to other factors such as external changes or sectoral influences. This is 
confirmed by looking at factor loadings in Table 3, with property prices being more 
sensitive to common cyclical movements (37%), while equity prices show an 88.2% 
(11.8% to common cyclical movements) responsiveness to idiosyncratic movements. 
While this provides strong evidence of sectoral or external changes driving equity price 
volatility, it does not provide insight into periods driven by idiosyncratic movements. 
 
Figure 5: South African financial cycle and credit-to-GDP gap, 1980 to 2016 
One way to disentangle periods driven by common versus idiosyncratic factors is by 
comparing two measures of the financial cycle. Currently, the South African Reserve 
Bank measures the South African cycle based on the parsimonious relationship 
between credit, house prices and equity prices (SARB, 2015). Conversely, the 
financial cycle extracted in this study is based on a time-varying financial conditions 
index (FCI), like Hatzius et al. (2010) for the USA and Kabundi and Mbelu (2017) for 
South Africa. Given that both include equity prices under different assumptions, strong 
positive co-movement between the two measures would provide evidence against 
idiosyncratic periods over the sample. 
Figure 6 compares the correlation between the extracted financial cycle and an 
estimate of the SARB financial cycle. While the SARB uses the Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass filter, this study uses factor analysis to replicate the cycle 
with the same set of variables for comparison. Despite using a different methodology, 
the estimated SARB cycle appears significantly smoother than the extracted cycle. 
With a correlation coefficient of 22% (Table 4), the two series exhibit a weak positive 
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relationship, with the estimated SARB cycle leading the extracted cycle, except after 
the 2007/2008 crisis. 
Upswings from both cycles appear to be relatively aligned, although the estimated 
SARB financial cycle captures a stronger 2007/2008 crisis risk build-up with a longer 
duration beginning in 2000. Moreover, neither the 1983/1984 peak, nor the potential 
idiosyncratic period from 1999 to 2003, are captured by the estimated SARB financial 
cycle. Conversely, downswings from the estimated SARB cycle appear to deepen, 
except following the 2007/2008 crisis. The end of the sample also differs between the 
series, with the estimated SARB cycle reporting an upswing while the extracted 
financial cycle is declining. Rather than reflecting the end-point problem characteristic 
within filtering techniques, this is more likely due to the lower frequency of the SARB 
cycle compared to the extracted cycle. Since equity prices are included in both 
measures, the higher frequency of the extracted financial cycle is likely due the explicit 
inclusion of variables that attempt to capture common external movements. 
 
Figure 6: Extracted South African financial cycle and SARB financial cycle, 1980 to 2016 
Note: Following Drehmann et al. (2012a), the SARB (2015) estimates the financial cycle with total credit, residential 
property prices and equity prices as indicators using the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass filter. This 
paper uses factor analysis to replicate the SARB financial cycle with the same variables deflated by the consumer 
price index, logged and expressed as four-quarter changes. All series are standardised, with one factor being 
chosen to explain the common variance among the three variables. 
Given stronger evidence for the role of common external factors and potential 
idiosyncratic periods, a more direct way to disentangle common from idiosyncratic 
periods is by comparing measures of the domestic and global financial cycle. Stronger 
positive co-movement between the two series would provide evidence of common 
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external factors driving the domestic cycle. To that end, Figure 7 shows the correlation 
between the extracted South African financial cycle and the Miranda-Agrippino and 
Rey (2018) global financial cycle. It is evident from the graph that the series generally 
co-move throughout the sample, with evidence of a slight lead in the global financial 
cycle until the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. This is corroborated by a moderate 
positive correlation coefficient of about 45% (Table 4) for both global samples. 
From 1980 to 1996, the series appear to follow each other rather closely, except for 
the South African financial cycle showing a higher amplitude over the gold price and 
spending booms during the early 1980s. Additionally, the global financial cycle 
appears to show a slight lead (with potentially stronger transmission) in relation to the 
South African cycle over this period. The strength of transmission may be inferred by 
the close synchronicity to the global trough in 1982 and the global peaks of 1983 and 
1987. Therefore, despite not being captured by the SARB financial cycle estimate, the 
1983/1984 spending boom appears to be driven by common global factors. 
Specifically, another brief boom in the gold price boosted capital inflows, rand 
appreciation and rising gold and foreign reserves. Therefore, the potential strength of 
global transmission may be indicative of stronger financial linkages through higher 
levels of foreign liabilities over this period (Balakrishnan et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 7: South African financial cycle and global financial cycle, 1980 to 2016 
Note: The global financial cycle is obtained from the Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2018) long- and short-sample 
global factors. The long sample covers the period 1975 to 2010 and the short sample covers the period 1990 to 
2012. The global factors are extracted using dynamic factor analysis and standardised for comparability to the 
South African financial cycle. 
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During the early 1990s, both series increased due to the global rise in technology that 
boosted equities. While the global financial cycle appears to reflect the build-up to the 
Dotcom Bubble over the decade, the South African financial cycle appears more 
volatile. From 1994 to 1995, the South African financial cycle contracts briefly due to 
political and economic uncertainty surrounding the democratic transition at the time  
(SARB, 1994). Moreover, while the global financial cycle continues a steep ascent until 
the AFC in 1998, the South African financial cycle enters a downswing from 1996 to 
1998. This provides strong evidence for domestic or regional idiosyncratic factors 
driving the realisation of actual defaults in the South African financial cycle from 1996 
to 1998. Additionally, the global financial cycle appears to have a stronger lead (with 
potentially weaker transmission) over the South African financial cycle following the 
AFC. Evidence is seen in the global movement between 1997 and 1999, which is only 
captured by the South African financial cycle between 1999 and 2000. This potentially 
weaker transmission could be explained by lower foreign liabilities in South Africa due 
to higher regional EMDE risk following the AFC. 

















0.434 0.456 -0.616 -0.335 0.222 
Over the early millennium period, from 1999 to 2003, both series contract together as 
risk sentiment in the main financial centres began to turn against EMDEs,39 including 
South Africa (SARB, 1998). Significant capital outflows caused massive currency 
depreciations amidst falling commodity prices. Despite relative macroeconomic 
stability and a sound financial system, South Africa experienced large bond market 
sell-offs, which represented the primary transmission mechanism of the AFC (SARB, 
1999). However, supporting previous evidence of a domestic idiosyncratic period, the 
series temporarily diverge from 2001 to 2003. This was most likely caused by severe 
currency destabilisation, when an appreciating rand drove the South African financial 
cycle upswing from 2001 to 2002. As the speculative rand bubble burst in early 2002, 
                                                          
39 EME sentiment was further damaged by Russia’s emergency rouble depreciation and unilateral 
external and domestic debt restructuring (SARB, 1998). 
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the South African financial cycle responded with a sharp downswing as mass currency 
sell-offs drove a depreciating rand until late 2003. 
Leading up to the recent crisis, excessive global credit extension, backed by exotic 
equity derivatives and real estate booms, led to substantial levels of rising default risk 
from 2004 to 2008. As the boom turned to bust and the crisis erupted, both series 
declined sharply as asset values plummeted, currencies lost value and massive global 
credit defaults were realised. While the global financial cycle began turning from its 
peak in early 2007, the South African financial cycle followed a year later, in early 
2008. To avoid a global depression, AEs began quantitative easing to stabilise their 
economies in late 2008. This resulted in a partial global rebound from 2009, which 
marked the beginning of the great recession. Despite fears of a double-dip US 
recession and a European debt crisis, EMDEs like South Africa managed to attract 
significant capital inflows due to lower regional risk aversion and favourable interest 
rate differentials from 2009 to 2012.  
While both cycles have remained relatively stable since 2011,40 there is evidence that 
the relationship between the two series might have changed following the crisis. Since 
2009, the relationship appears to be contemporaneous, albeit with varying 
magnitudes. On the one hand, this could suggest an increase in the strength and 
speed of global transmission to the South African economy. It could also, however, 
reflect the post-crisis search for yield based on idiosyncratic EMDE risk perception. 
Moreover, the taper tantrum in 2013 may have caused a divergence towards a 
possible third idiosyncratic period, from 2014 to 2016. Given that the lead-lag 
relationship is not explicitly tested in this study, the strength and speed of transmission 
can only be inferred. However, the results confirm a moderately procyclical 
relationship between common global financial movements and the South African 
financial cycle. 
                                                          




Figure 8: South African financial cycle and CBOE VIX, 1980 to 2016 
Note: The CBOE VIX series, collected from FRED, only begins in 1990 
Finally, an analysis of the co-movement between the South African financial cycle and 
the VIX may provide further insight into idiosyncratic periods. Therefore, Figure 8 
shows the correlation between the South African financial cycle and the CBOE VIX, 
with the negative value of the financial cycle used here for better comparison. As 
mentioned in the literature review, the VIX is commonly used as a measure of global 
market uncertainty and risk aversion, which is inversely related to the global financial 
cycle (Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2018). Similarly, with a correlation of -62% (see Table 
4), the South African financial cycle and the VIX exhibit a moderately strong negative 
relationship. 
Confirming the idiosyncratic build-up of EMDE regional risk from 1996 to 1998, global 
uncertainty and risk aversion rose due to EMDE debt restructuring, the Mexico crisis 
in 1995 and the AFC in 1997 (Park & Mercado, 2014). Despite this rise in global risk 
aversion, the global financial cycle continued its upswing, while the South African 
financial cycle responded with a significant contraction as large defaults were realised 
until the end of 1999. This result is consistent with Park and Mercado (2014), who find 
greater turmoil in individual EMDE financial systems during EMDE crises. 
The second idiosyncratic period, from 2001 to 2003, is also confirmed, with high global 
risk aversion alongside rising domestic default risk and low global risk aversion during 
the massive rand depreciation in 2001. Despite the September 11 attacks in the USA, 
the Turkish stock market crash and the Latin American financial crisis, global risk 
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aversion began descending to its lowest levels following US and UK decisions to 
invade Iraq. As the war on Iraq erupted in 2003, low global risk aversion sustained an 
expanding global and domestic financial cycle until the end 2007, when the first signs 
of a crisis emerged. The VIX then began an ascend to its highest levels as global 
uncertainty and risk aversion rose during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. As 
unconventional monetary policy from AEs drove market certainty, the VIX began a 
descent, reaching its average in 2010. 
Interestingly, however, the relationship appears to have weakened after the crisis, with 
low global risk aversion alongside a falling domestic financial cycle. This provides 
strong support for the idea of a possible third idiosyncratic period, from 2014 to 2016. 
Despite the European debt crisis that began in 2011 and the geopolitical risk from the 
Arab Spring, beginning in 2012, global risk aversion has been returning to levels last 
seen before the crisis. Conversely, events such as the fall of Africa Bank in 2014, the 
shuffling of finance ministers since 2015 and the continuing political uncertainty appear 
to be raising South African risk relative to other EMDEs (Kabundi & Mbelu, 2017). 
Therefore, this suggests that the South African financial cycle has a stronger response 
to changes in global risk aversion based on idiosyncratic EMDE risk factors. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the South African financial cycle is not 
isolated from common global financial movements. South Africa is often classified as 
a middle-income EMDE in Africa (World Bank, 2018). Most middle-income EMDEs are 
often characterised by weakly capitalised financial markets with low levels of global 
integration. However, the South African financial market is well capitalised and highly 
advanced (SARB, 2018b). Moreover, the South African financial system is sound and 
highly integrated into the global financial market. Therefore, it should come as no 
surprise that part of South Africa’s financial procyclicality is determined by common 
global fluctuations. 
Summary of Findings 
Based on the results, the following conclusions may be drawn about South Africa’s 
financial cycle: 
1. The South African credit cycle is weakly countercyclical to the business cycle, 
possibly suggesting that credit growth might lag behind real domestic output. 
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While asset prices play a significant role leading up to the global financial crisis, 
other factors determine the potential for excessive private sector credit growth. 
Specifically, commodity price, exchange rate, structural and regulatory changes 
also play a role in determining domestic credit growth. This suggests that 
various factors may contribute to cyclical fluctuations that characterise the 
South African macro-financial system. 
2. The South African financial cycle appears to be driven by common systematic 
movements in the funding, credit, equity and global markets. Banking sector 
leverage is found to be countercyclical (rising during downswings) and 
contributes the highest share to common movements. This may be used to 
confirm the countercyclicality of South Africa’s credit market. Additionally, 
leverage has the lowest response to changes in common fluctuations. 
Conversely, the business cycle, short-term interest rates and global commodity 
markets have the highest response to changes in common domestic 
fluctuations. Therefore, the global market contributes a significant share, with 
an equally high response to changes in common movements. 
3. The South African financial cycle has a moderately positive relationship with 
the global financial cycle. This suggests a procyclical relationship, with 
evidence of a slight lead in global fluctuations. Additionally, the South African 
financial cycle has a moderately strong negative relationship with the VIX. This 
suggests a stronger response to changes in global risk aversion based on 
idiosyncratic EMDE risk factors. Taken together, this implies that the South 
African financial cycle is not isolated from common global financial movements. 
Given a highly advanced and globally integrated financial market, we can infer 
that South African post-crisis public sector debt growth may partly be driven by 
monetary policy at the centre.  
Policy Recommendations 
EMDE risk factors 
Despite a significant rebound since the great recession, global growth remains fragile 
due to differences between AEs and EMDEs. Particularly, while AEs show continued 
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strength with above-average growth levels, expectations among EMDEs remain 
mixed. For commodity-importing EMDEs, growth prospects appear to remain 
favourable. However, growth in commodity-exporting EMDEs is expected to mature 
over the medium term. Moreover, the ongoing withdrawal of accommodative monetary 
policy in AEs has resulted in a tightening of global financing conditions, with significant 
consequences for EMDEs across the board (World Bank, 2018). 
Since 2013, rising global interest rates and stronger US dollar appreciation have raised 
the external finance premium, depreciated currencies and reduced capital inflows to 
EMDEs. Consequently, as appetite continues to wane for higher yielding EMDE debt, 
borrowing costs have risen, with deteriorating credit quality placing additional pressure 
on credit rating downgrades for these economies. As such, global investors have 
become more perceptive in differentiating among EMDEs based on interest rate 
exposure and currency volatility, despite continued sovereign issuance from these 
countries.41  
With medium-term expectations of further reductions in capital flows, EMDEs appear 
to face significant downside risks as prospects of faster paced increases in global 
interest rates abound. From the perspective of policy considerations, this requires a 
strong focus on rebuilding policy buffers to withstand the potential unintended 
consequences of global financial spill-overs. In addition, with changing global export 
demand, rising trade protectionism, and policy uncertainty, EMDE policymakers 
should consider longer term structural changes aimed at boosting competitiveness 
and adaptability to technological change. 
South African risk factors 
The results from the previous section support both global and national findings; 
however, they also raise questions around the susceptibility of the South African 
macro-financial system to changes in the global financial cycle and global risk 
aversion. While an empirical analysis of national susceptibility is beyond the scope of 
this study, for EMDEs like South Africa it appears to depend heavily on the state of 
existing idiosyncratic vulnerabilities (Byrne & Fiess, 2016). For South Africa, such 
                                                          
41 Despite decreases in credit quality among EMDEs, international bond issuance remains strong, 
mostly driven by rising corporate borrowing in China and sovereign issuances in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(World Bank, 2018). 
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vulnerabilities appear to come from three areas: (1) a fragile domestic fiscal position 
and changing composition of externally denominated debt, (2) coinciding downward 
phases of the business and financial cycles, and (3) rising trade protectionism and 
changing patterns of global demand. 
Fiscal Fragility and Changing Composition of Externally Denominated Debt 
Despite recent efforts towards fiscal consolidation and debt stabilisation, South 
Africa’s public sector financial position remains vulnerable (SARB, 2018a). This is 
driven primarily by rising contingent exposure to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) like 
Eskom and the Road Accident Fund. Rising liquidity shortfalls among SOEs may place 
additional upward pressure on government guarantees, should these enterprises roll 
debt over the medium term. This may increase the already substantial borrowing 
requirement, leading to further credit rating downgrades, which may result in a 
negative feedback loop through investor perceptions and the domestic banking sector. 
Additionally, changes in the composition of external public sector debt since 
democracy appear to be a cause for concern. 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis from 2010 to 2017, South African total 
gross loan government debt has been increasing steadily, from around 40% to 50% 
of GDP (SARB, 2018a). While domestic debt contributes the largest share, rand-
denominated external debt held by non-residents has been increasing over the period. 
Concerning the literature, balance sheets with large foreign currency liability exposure 
present the highest systemic risk (Desai et al., 2008; Feyen et al., 2017; World Bank, 
2018). Therefore, a brief examination of South African external debt dynamics is 
warranted. 
From 1994 to 2017, South African total external debt,42 in US dollar terms, increased 
at a compounded annual growth rate of 8.0% (SARB, 2018a). By the end of 2017, this 
amounted to US$173.3 billion,43 with government bonds comprising 86.6% of total 
debt securities. Over the same period since democracy, the composition has shifted 
away from US-denominated foreign currency debt to rand-denominated debt held by 
non-resident investors. On the one hand, this reflects the growing share of diversified 
                                                          
42 Defined as all domestic and foreign currency-denominated liabilities of residents that require principal 
and/or interest repayment to non-residents (SARB, 2018a). 
43 This amounts to R2 131 billion, comprising other debt of R1 094 billion (of which 29% is private sector 
loans and deposits) and debt securities of R1 037 billion (SARB, 2018a). 
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non-resident asset investment due to the great recession search for yield. On the other 
hand, it also reveals the growing share of total external liabilities accruing to general 
government (42% in December 2017).  
Over the period since democracy, South Africa’s share of total foreign currency 
external debt denominated in US dollar terms has grown by a mediocre compounded 
annual growth rate of 5.6% (SARB, 2018a). Since 2002, this has been driven mainly 
by banking and non-financial private sector short-term other debt.44 While the 
repayment schedule of just over half of this debt (53.3%) is due in the short term, the 
majority occurs within FDI multinational relationships, which tend to be rolled over to 
the longer term. Conversely, the share of total rand-denominated external debt in US 
dollar terms has risen by a faster paced compounded annual growth rate of 11.5% 
(SARB, 2018a). This is attributed mainly to non-resident investor search for yield and 
the 2012 inclusion of South Africa in the Citi World Government Bond Index.  
Moreover, since the financial crisis, growth in the issuance of rand-denominated 
general government bonds held by non-residents has increased from 8.6% in 2008 to 
31.8% in 2017 (SARB, 2018a). This increase appears indicative of fiscal deficit-
funding requirements for infrastructure upgrades in the transport and energy sectors 
over the period. Additionally, growth in total banking sector holdings of government 
bond and Treasury bill assets has increased by about 82% since 2012 (SARB, 2018a). 
While this may reflect the consequences of regulatory adherence,45 it may also reflect 
growing banking sector susceptibility to unwelcomed global changes through external 
public sector exposure. 
Coinciding Downward Phases of the Business and Financial Cycle  
The South African business cycle has been in a downward phase since the end of 
2013, with the financial cycle following suit since the end of 2016 (SARB, 2018a). 
Reflective of subdued macroeconomic conditions, this is confirmed by downswings in 
credit and asset prices since the end of 2012. As discussed in the literature review, 
coinciding downward phases of the business and financial cycle may result in deeper 
                                                          
44 The value of other debt comprises loans and deposits that reflect private, public and monetary sector 
borrowing (SARB, 2018a). 
45 The Basel III liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requires increased proportions of higher yielding assets 
for the management of banking sector liquidity between shorter dated funding and medium- to long-
term credit extension (SARB, 2018a). 
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and more protracted recessions. This could increase unemployment, raise debt levels 
and reduce debt service ability, which would translate into higher impairments and 
reduced asset quality in the banking sector. Moreover, the introduction of IFRS 946 
may be exacerbated and place additional pressure on banking capital and reserves in 
such an environment. 
Rising Trade Protectionism and Changing Patterns of Global Demand 
Recent prospects of rising US trade protectionist measures could reverse the 
improvements in global growth since the financial crisis. Specifically, should the US 
continue raising import tariffs over the medium term, this could raise the risk of 
retaliatory measures, spur on a trade war and lead to a global recession (SARB, 
2018a; World Bank, 2018). From a domestic financial-stability perspective, this may 
raise global inflation while reducing global growth, asset prices and exports. Moreover, 
as major EMDEs shift towards less commodity-intensive activities, threats of changing 
global demand may dampen commodity prices, resulting in lower export revenues for 
commodity-exporting countries like South Africa.  
Therefore, South Africa appears to face significant medium-term susceptibility to 
global spill-overs through public sector financial fragility, lower growth prospects and 
changing global demand. While private sector credit risk appears to be contained 
within domestic multinationals, large, external public sector exposure may still pose 
substantial financial stability risks should South Africa experience a US monetary 
policy shock. Taken together, this raises South Africa’s vulnerability to lower investor 
confidence, higher asset price volatility and significant credit default risk. However, the 
possibility of a global financial cycle as an international transmission mechanism 
creates some opportunities for policy design and implementation. Practically, this calls 
for policy to be designed with enough flexibility to lean against the changing global 
patterns while still enabling a strong focus on national objectives. Specifically, it 
requires a combination of strategically flexible short- to medium-term measures that 
both prepare and restore policy scope for the implementation of more aggressive, 
longer term macroeconomic policy. 
                                                          
46 The International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 for financial instruments became effective 
in January 2018 and follows the expected credit loss (ECL) model, which came about as a response to 
the global financial crisis (SARB, 2018a). 
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Macro-Financial Policy Recommendations 
Short- to medium-term monetary policy   
To prepare policy scope for the potential effects of global spill-overs and changing 
global demand, monetary policy should focus on extending forecast horizons over the 
medium-term. In the event of severe currency depreciations, temporary capital 
controls may be considered. While foreign currency intervention appears tempting, it 
may only temporarily reduce the value of rand-denominated foreign debt while 
simultaneously lowering short-term cash flows. As an alternative, forecast horizons 
beyond the traditional 12 to 24 months are designed to lean against the medium-term 
build-up of aggregate credit imbalances (Borio, 2012; World Bank, 2018). This may 
reduce the potential for domestic amplification by improving the accuracy and timing 
of more targeted policies (Borio et al., 2001; Botha, De Jager, Ruch & Steinbach, 
2017). 
Since 2017, the SARB has begun promoting the quarterly projection model (QPM) as 
the headline model for growth and inflation forecasts (Botha et al., 2017; SARB, 
2017a). While maintaining the core model47 in a supporting role, the QPM is used to 
analyse the nature of shocks on the longer term behaviour of economic forces over 
time. This is achieved by assuming that monetary policy can only influence the short-
run cyclical features of the economy defined by deviations from longer term equilibrium 
trends. This allows policymakers to better communicate the short-term consequences 
of policy actions that are based on more accurate, longer term dynamics.48  
While the QPM is found to outperform random walk models over longer forecast 
horizons, its main limitation lies in the use of aggregated variables, which fail to capture 
idiosyncratic disaggregated behaviour (Botha et al., 2017). Therefore, while the QPM 
represents a significant theoretical improvement, it needs to be complemented by the 
practical use of flexible but targeted capital controls. Given the primary concern of this 
study, the use of capital controls should be viewed within the context of leaning against 
changes in cross-border debt flows. Given the changing composition of South African 
                                                          
47 The core model has served as South Africa’s frontline model for growth and inflation forecasts since 
the implementation of inflation targeting in 2000 (SARB, 2017a). 
48 The medium term can be characterised as three to six years, while the long run is eight years or more 
(Botha et al., 2017). 
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external debt, policymakers are advised to consider the use of a macroprudential 
stability levy on systemically relevant exposure to changes in external rand-
denominated debt. 
Specifically, taxes could be levied on large sales of rand-denominated asset holdings 
to deter unwelcome capital outflows. Moreover, taxes may be levied on large 
exposures to non‐core49 external rand-denominated liabilities to lean against capital 
inflows during expansions. While this may provide a source of state revenue and 
restrain unwelcome balance-sheet movements, additional attention needs to be paid 
to changes in the strength of domestic transmission channels, which depend on the 
institutional and regulatory environment (Igan et al., 2011). 
From the literature is appears that the exchange rate channel in South Africa responds 
rapidly to contractionary policy with a temporary appreciation (Gumata, Kabundi & 
Ndou, 2013). While short-term capital outflows are deterred, exports and aggregate 
demand experience a temporary decline that influences the current account after a 
year. Moreover, externally exposed domestic balance sheets are more likely to 
experience stronger temporary asset-side improvement rather than liability-side 
weakness. While empirically testing the current strength of these channels is beyond 
the scope of this study, some inferences can be made by looking at changes in the 
domestic institutional and regulatory environment. 
Since the fall of Africa Bank in 2014, policymakers have made significant 
improvements to regulations with the implementation of the Financial Services 
Regulation Act No. 9 of 2017. As discussed in the literature, the Twin Peaks regulatory 
framework aims to create an environment of financial stability to support balanced and 
sustainable growth. Specifically, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA), 
which replaced the Financial Services Board, has made significant improvements in 
monitoring external business and consumer exposure to financial products such as 
unit trusts and pension funds. Similarly, the Prudential Authority (PA) – operating 
through the SARB – has made improvements in monitoring systemic risk by publishing 
measures of the financial cycle and a financial conditions index (FCI).  
                                                          
49 For example, FX derivatives positions. 
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Based on such regulatory improvements, domestic transmission channels are likely to 
be strengthened significantly. Therefore, policymakers are still faced with the 
challenge of managing potentially significant capital flow reversals. Given the longer 
term consequences of short-term currency intervention, policymakers are advised to 
consider a range of alternative targeted capital-control measures that deter excessive 
leverage in unsustainable asset price growth if the vulnerability arises. Such 
vulnerabilities may be determined using specific macroprudential tools. 
Short- to medium-term prudential policy 
Ideally, prudential policy space should be restored during contractions by drawing 
down on buffers that were created by leaning against the build-up of expansions 
(BCBS, 2010; Borio, 2012; Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2018; Rey, 2013, 2016). In 
South Africa, however, policy preparation and restoration are complicated by the 
existing need for public sector balance-sheet repair. Therefore, with a stronger focus 
on reducing the amplitude of externally exposed banking sector asset values, this 
study suggests the combined use of balance sheet stress‐testing and leverage limits. 
Balance Sheet Stress‐testing   
As discussed in the literature review, stress-testing represents one of the tools that is 
based on reducing global transmission effects using cyclical measures to reduce 
excessive credit growth (Rey, 2013). Given the challenges associated with the rule-
based Basel III CCB in South Africa’s countercyclical credit market, a better alternative 
would be to increase the frequency of targeted financial sector balance sheet stress-
testing. Specifically, policymakers are advised to pay close attention to bank and non-
bank institutions with higher exposure to rand-denominated external assets.  
Given appropriate capital buffers, loan‐to‐value and debt‐to‐income ratios can then be 
used to manage lending behaviour by increasing (decreasing) lending standards 
during booms (contractions). However, such measures may be subject to political 
distortions that encourage investment, particular asset classes (Rey, 2013). 
Therefore, a more prudent option would be to consider measures that directly 
influence the capacity to take on more leverage. 
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Tougher Leverage Limits 
The use of leverage limits represents an attempt to address the effects of global 
transmission by structurally affecting the procyclicality of leverage (Rey, 2013). As 
discussed in the literature, the leverage ratio of Basel III may be used as a simple 
management tool to reduce excessive balance sheet leverage growth. Therefore, to 
supplement the capital framework, South African policymakers are advised to 
implement tougher leverage ratios, especially for institutions and corporates that are 
highly sensitive to changes in financing costs. 
Short- to medium-term fiscal policy   
Given the fragile state of South African public sector balance sheets, policymakers are 
currently faced with limited fiscal buffers to prepare for the potentially negative effects 
of US monetary policy spill-overs. Public sector debt vulnerabilities emanate from 
growing shares of domestically issued rand-denominated government bonds held by 
non-residents. On the one hand, this reflects the increase in non-resident investment 
that is driven by a search for higher yields. On the other hand, it reflects the rising 
fiscal-deficit financing required for public corporation restructuring. 
Therefore, policymakers are advised to consider targeted levies on international credit 
flows for financing other than public sector restructuring. Exemptions could be 
provided for international credit flows towards funding education, healthcare and public 
infrastructure improvements. Such a policy would reallocate short- to medium-term 
non-resident debt spending towards higher yielding growth-enhancing investment. 
Moreover, this should be complemented by improvements in debt management 
capacity and sustainable lending practices (World Bank, 2018). Given anticipated 
changes to global export demand, investment selection should also be guided by 
macroeconomic objectives that support longer term export-sector diversification. 
Long-term macroeconomic policy  
South Africa requires a strategic combination of macroeconomic policy reforms to 
enable the development of long-term fiscal and economic sustainability (Halland et al., 
2017; Mendes & Pennings, 2017; World Bank, 2018). The role of the state to act as a 
professional long-term investor should guide the design of fiscal reforms. For example, 
targeted and well-managed strategic investment funds (SIFs) could be set up to build 
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long-term fiscal capacity. If these funds are directed towards diversifying the 
commodity-export sector, they would deepen capital markets and create new 
investment opportunities for the country. 
Based on the literature, increased export diversification and fiscal capacity will 
strengthen both long-term growth and the ability to withstand global spill-overs (Hesse, 
2008; World Bank, 2018). Therefore, the diversification of exports should guide longer 
term macroeconomic policy away from being resource based to idiosyncratic 
knowledge and technology based. For South Africa, this could be done by deepening 
regional trade agreements, increasing support for firms to absorb new technologies, 
and redesigning education and training programmes (Callen et al., 2014; World Bank, 
2018). 
Increased non-tariff barriers in regional Africa could yield gains through improved 
value chain integration, competition and productivity. Competitive advantage can then 
be gained through technology diffusion and adaption in the manufacturing sector, such 
as increased digitalisation (mobile and internet technologies) or advanced robotics. To 
avoid displacing long-run employment, education and training policies need to be 
adapted for available skills to benefit from changing technological and developmental 
needs. 
This can be done by fostering a social, economic and political environment directed 
towards fusing indigenous African knowledge with current technological 
advancements. This would improve labour market efficiency while fostering a spirit of 
entrepreneurship and innovation that is necessary for long-term growth and 
development sustainability (World Bank, 2018). Taken together, the most appropriate 
policy to deal with the ‘dilemma’ appears to be actions directed towards the main 
sources of concern (Rey, 2013). This can be summarised by a combination of targeted 
policy frameworks that are flexible enough to lean against the possibility of medium-







Since the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, growth in EMDE debt levels has increased 
significantly in both the private corporate and public sectors. In South Africa, while 
aggregate private sector credit levels have decreased, public sector debt levels have 
been increasing steadily over the past ten years. Moreover, with the rise in financial 
globalisation and the changing composition of foreign government debt, this has raised 
questions regarding the role of common external factors in explaining such 
phenomena. Therefore, while the factors that trigger excessive credit and leverage 
growth may appear to be benign, the mechanism through which the financial cycle 
propagates the business should be of key importance to policymakers in EMDEs, 
including South Africa.  
It is against this backdrop that this mini-dissertation has questioned the common 
driving forces behind the systematic build-up of credit default risk in the South African 
financial system. Specifically, the study has questioned the determinants of the South 
African financial cycle to ascertain whether or not it is isolated from common global 
financial movements. If it is found not to be isolated, we can then infer that growth in 
South African public sector debt levels may be due to external factors rather than 
country-specific characteristics.  
The empirical analysis was conducted in two stages. To begin with, the HP filter was 
used to extract the South African aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP gap. The aim 
was to determine whether or not the domestic credit cycle is procyclical to the business 
cycle. Next, a dynamic factor model was used to extract the common cyclical 
movements from 13 macro-financial variables that were chosen to represent the entire 
South African financial system. The goal was to determine the main driving forces 
behind the domestic financial cycle that arise from co-movements between various 
sectors of the macro-financial economy.   
Based on the empirical evidence, the South African credit cycle appears to be weakly 
countercyclical to the business cycle. In contrast to financial accelerator theory, this 
may suggest a lead-lag relationship, in which South African output leads credit growth. 
Additionally, commodity price, structural, regulatory, exchange rate and asset price 
changes all affect the potential for excessive domestic private sector credit growth. 
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Moreover, the South African financial cycle is driven primarily by common movements 
in the funding, credit, equity and global markets. Interestingly, South African banking 
sector leverage is found to be countercyclical, with the highest contribution but lowest 
response to common systematic movements. Additionally, the real-sector, short-term 
interest rates and global market have the highest response to common movements. 
Therefore, the global market contributes a significant share, with an equally high 
response to changes in common movements. 
Moreover, the South African financial cycle is shown to exhibit moderately positive co-
movement with the global financial cycle. This implies a moderate procyclical 
relationship, with the possibility of a slight lead in common global fluctuations. 
Additionally, the South African financial cycle shows stronger negative co-movement 
with the VIX. This indicates a stronger response to changes in global risk aversion, 
possibly driven by idiosyncratic EMDE risk perception. Therefore, the South African 
financial cycle is not isolated from common global movements with higher 
susceptibility to idiosyncratic EMDE risk aversion. Given South Africa’s highly 
advanced and globally integrated financial market, we can thus infer that South African 
public sector debt growth may be driven partly by monetary policy changes elsewhere. 
Following a ten-year post-crisis period of favourable global financing conditions, 
reversals of US monetary policy accommodation have begun raising global borrowing 
costs. Combined with US dollar appreciation, this has caused significant reductions in 
capital inflows to EMDEs. Additionally, despite robust sovereign issuance in 
international bond markets, deteriorating credit quality in EMDE debt has led to further 
credit rating downgrades. Furthermore, AE investors have become more astute in 
differentiating among EMDEs based on growth expectations, as well as fiscal, interest 
rate and currency pressures. Given the medium-term expectations of South Africa’s 
weakening fiscal position and low growth prospects, neglecting the insights presented 
within this study would prove disastrous for maintaining macro-financial stability. 
Moreover, these results become more pertinent as medium-term expectations of faster 
paced US interest rates hikes rise in a domestic environment of low growth and 
vulnerable fiscal position.  
Should South Africa experience a US monetary policy spill-over shock, the financial 
system is likely to experience rising borrowing costs, higher market volatility and 
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significant asset price losses through bond yields and equities. This may be 
exacerbated by rising contingent and external government debt exposures, which 
could raise the borrowing requirement and increase risks of further credit rating 
downgrades. Moreover, the coinciding downward phases of the business and financial 
cycles may result in a deeper and longer recession. This combination of rising debt 
levels and lower growth prospects is likely to result in higher impairments and lower 
bank asset quality, which may create a negative feedback loop, leading to further 
domestic contraction and downgrades. 
Suggestive of significant monetary policy spill-overs, the results presented in this study 
appear to challenge the prevailing Mundellian trilemma theory for the South African 
economy. Specifically, South Africa appears to face a Mundellian ‘dilemma’, with 
domestic policy partly dictated by monetary policy changes elsewhere. With the jury 
still out regarding the consequences of increased financial globalisation, this implies 
new challenges and considerations for national policymaking. Therefore, this study 
proposes a strategic combination of short- to medium-term monetary, prudential and 
fiscal policy measures to support longer term macroeconomic policy objectives. 
Practically, monetary policy should focus on extending forecast horizons over the 
medium term, with the potential use of temporary alternative capital controls in the 
case of severe currency depreciations. Prudential policy should focus on increased 
balance sheet stress‐testing and tougher leverage limits for banks’ higher exposure to 
external assets and corporations with highly sensitive debt-service costs. Additionally, 
policymakers should consider the implementation of macroprudential stability levies 
for systemically relevant exposures to changes in externally denominated debt. Fiscal 
policy should consider targeted taxes on international credit flows directed to 
investment other than public sector restructuring. Finally, all measures should be 
guided by overarching macroeconomic policy directed towards the development of 
longer term export-sector diversification. 
While this study builds on the ongoing research concerning the relationship between 
post-crisis global and domestic transmission mechanisms, some caveats remain to be 
explored. Given the theoretical challenges underlying the use of the HP filter, further 
research would benefit from employing the techniques proposed by Hamilton (2017) 
or Grant and Chan (2017) for extracting the credit-to-GDP gap in South Africa. 
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Additionally, explicit testing of the lead-lag relationship between credit and output 
would provide stronger justification for the argument that the South African business 
cycle leads credit growth. Moreover, research into the potential fluctuations of credit 
extension (proxied by loans and advances) without the presence of Basel III capital 
requirements may provide more accurate insights into the dynamics behind domestic 
banking-sector leverage. 
Moreover, further research into South African debt service ratios (DSRs) that focuses 
on capturing the joint dynamics of a wider set of variables may prove useful for 
understanding relative domestic debt unsustainability. Finally, further research into the 
correlations between domestic and regional EMDE financial cycles with the global 
financial cycle would be beneficial. This would be further enhanced by including the 
same variables used to capture the global financial cycle and may provide insight into 
the strength of regional versus global spill-over effects for South Africa. 
Prior to the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, the idea of financial stability being a 
natural consequence of macroeconomic stability appeared to be valid. However, 
based on growing evidence of the presence of a global financial cycle, this is shown 
to be a misguided thought. Moreover, while some crises (like the AFC or 2007/2008 
crisis) may become systemic, not all crises affect the entire financial system and thus 
remain contained in various sectors. While this implies a greater role for gross cross-
border flows for domestic financial stability, it also necessitates improvements in the 
monitoring and measurement of each sector, as well as of the macro-financial system 
as a whole. 
More fundamentally, academics, economists and policymakers require a deeper 
understanding of the modern monetary nature of our economies. The modern banking 
system appears to generate ‘nominal’50 rather than real purchasing power. Moreover, 
as loans have come to create deposits, the power of money to systematically create 
instability has also risen. Better modelling to capture such changes may thus require 
a move towards more disequilibrium analysis to capture both systemic and sectoral 
distortions51 that arise due to unsustainable domestic and global macro-financial 
                                                          
50 Financial contracts tend to be set in nominal rather than real terms, with early analysis of the 
distinction between ‘real’ and ‘nominal’ provided in Kohn (1986). 
51 See Borio (2012) and Wicksell (1898). 
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conditions. Only then would it be possible to fully capture the role of financial cycles 
and policy effects in the modern macroeconomy. 
“The financial cycle … should not be considered a recurrent, regular feature of the 
economy, which inevitably unfolds in a specific way i.e. a regular and stationary 
process. Rather, it is a tendency for a set of variables to evolve in a specific way 
responding to the economic environment and policies within it.”  
(Claudio Borio, 2012) 
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Table A: List of variables 
No. Description T-code S-code 
Real sector 
1. Real GDP at market prices (2010 = 100)  3 S 
Credit market 
2. Private credit: total credit extended by all monetary institutions to the 
domestic private sector (market prices)  
3 S 
3. Term spread: Government bonds 10 years and over – 0 to 3 years 1 S 
4. Corporate bond spread: Eskom bonds – Government bonds 0 to 3 years 1 S 
Forex market 
5. Exchange rate: real effective rate against the most important currencies 
(Index: 2010 = 100, averages) 
3 S 
Real estate market 
6. Property prices: ABSA House Price Index (2000 = 100) 3 B 
Funding market 
7. 3-month JIBAR 2 S 
8. Leverage ratio: Bank and mutual banks Total Assets/Total Equity (Rmill) 
ratio 
3 S 
9. Aggregate Money: Nominal M2 3 S 
Equity market 
10. Equity prices: South Africa Share Price Index  3 I 
11. SAVI: SA Volatility Index 1 B 
12. Bank volatility: JSE financials index annualised volatility 1 B 
Global market 
13. Commodity prices: global commodity price index (market prices and unit 
values) 
3 I 
14. Global financial cycle * 1 MR 
15. VIX * 1 F 
Note: T-code: 1 = Level, 2 = First difference, 3 = Log difference; S-code: S = South African Reserve Bank, I = IMF 
International Financial Statistics, B = INET BFA, MR = Miranda-Aggripino and Rey (2018), F = Federal Reserve 
Bank of Saint Louis Economic Data (FRED). * Variables not used in the construction of the South African financial 
cycle but used in comparison to it. 








 Level Level 
Decision 







in case of 
conflict 
Real GDP I(1) I(1)  I(0) I(0)  
Private sector credit I(1) I(1)  I(0) I(0)  
Term spread I(0) I(0)     
Corporate bond spread I(0) I(0)     
Exchange rate I(0) I(0)     
Property prices I(1) I(1)  I(1) I(0) I(0) 
JIBAR I(0) I(0)     
Leverage ratio  I(1) I(1)  I(0) I(0)  
Aggregate money I(1) I(1)  I(0) I(0)  
Equity price  I(0) I(0)     
SAVI  I(0) I(0)     
Bank volatility  I(1) I(0) I(0)    
Commodity prices I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(0)  
Those highlighted in blue showed conflicting results between ERS and KPSS at the 5% level. Following Igan et al. 
(2011), graphical evidence was examined closely, and unit root tests were also done, excluding a constant and 
trend. 
 
